THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Towards the New Reformation.

An article of exceptional interest to Modernists, 'Why I do not go to Church,' by Col. T. B. Luard, is published in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1937. The theme is a favourite one for newspaper correspondence in the silly season, but not particularly helpful except that, by indicating the many-sided grievance of the laity with Church worship, Church teaching and Church administration, it serves as a constant reminder to the clergy not to live in a fool's paradise.

Col. Luard's article is much more than an expression of ordinary lay dissatisfaction. It is marked, not only by a wide range of modern reading in the spheres of Biblical criticism, Christian origins and current philosophy, but by much serious reflection on the lessons which these subjects seem to teach. Again, Col. Luard's article is of value because, unlike most Englishmen, he will have nothing to do with compromise either in thought or policy, but takes his stand on truth as he sees it revealed by modern research; and demands its unflinching and immediate application to the existing Church situation. He is

for 'Reformation without tarrying for any,' and has no sympathy with the attitude described by a modern poet:

> 'Achilles ponders in his tent,
> The kings of modern thought are dumb,
> Silent they are, but not content,
> They wait to see the future come.
> Silent, while thoughts engrave the brow,
> Silent, the best are silent now.'

This for Col. Luard is nothing less than a conspiracy of silence. We are, he holds, about to enter on a new stage of our religious evolution — a stage of religious evolution to be accompanied by moral, economic, social, political and international changes; although these are not treated in his article, which is wisely limited to the religious situation. In his criticism and in his demands there are two things of which Col. Luard does not seem to us to be sufficiently conscious. (1) That some of 'the assured results' of research are not so assured, and if they are not assured they cannot be acted upon with advantage. (2) That the ideal which Modernists seek to achieve can only be reached by evolution, not by revolution. That continuity of our religious life and Christian institutions must be maintained; that we cannot start *de novo* with any hope of success; that the method of reform must be by the laborious method of education, illumination, persuasion; and above all we must, as far as possible, all co-operate in the spirit of good-will.

We do not deny that there is need for prophetic protests, for independent action, for daring experiment, but these are in their way only incidents, although needful incidents, in the great stream of religious progress. It may be necessary at times to refuse to go to church, but this cannot be either a permanent or universal religious policy, although it may very properly be used to call the attention of our Church authorities to a situation which not only demands recognition but radical remedies.

In this Modernist programme of reform by education, first and foremost must be placed the education of our clergy. And yet how slow the zealous Modernist is to recognize this basic fact of the Church situation and how little support he gives to efforts in this direction. Col. Luard writes thus of the clergy:

> 'With a few notable exceptions, the bishops and clergy speak and preach as if they were unaware of the case they have to answer.'

This is too true in many cases, but it is partly due to their preoccupation with all sorts of pressing practical problems. And even when clergymen are aware, their congregations are so largely unaware of the situation that they would think that their bishops and parsons had gone mad if they addressed them from the point of view of the modern religious situation as Col. Luard sees it.

We need a large body of Christian teachers thoroughly aware of the latest results, assured and speculative, in the sphere of Biblical studies, Christian origins, religious psychology, comparative religion, and so on, and we need them in all our schools and in all our pulpits. We need them also in the Church Assembly and on the Episcopal Bench, and that is the only way by which in the Church of England we can secure a courageous, helpful, influential transition from the passing age of 'Hebrew old clothes,' miraculous supernaturalism, dogmatic intolerance, magical materialism, ecclesiastical antagonisms, into the new age of fellowship in the spirit of love, truth and freedom unveiled to men in the real Gospel of Jesus Christ.

There are two questions which necessarily arise.

(1) Is it possible to secure such a body of Christian educationists?

The practical answer to this is one of resolution and resources. Within twenty years such a body of Christian educationists could be created if there were the will to do it.

(2) Is the Christian religion capable to-day of such a re-creation or transformation?

Vast numbers of Christians, whether Roman Catholic, Anglo-Catholic, Evangelical, Fundamentalist, will unhesitatingly and unanimously reply in the negative. In short, all the traditionalists will answer, No; and many of these traditionalists are in dominating positions in their Christian denominations. And we may add something more: all the secularists, agnostics, and indifferentists are in agreement on this point with the traditionalists. Modernists, on the other hand, have no doubt at all that the Christian religion is capable of such a re-creation, or rather, we ought to say, capable of such a spiritual and moral liberation and evolution.

We are not sure that Col. Luard is convinced that the religion which humanity needs in the new age is the Christian religion. It is clear to him that humanity needs a highly-enlightened moral and spiritual religion, but he writes at times in such a way as to make us doubt as to whether in his view it is the Christian religion that humanity needs. We are in entire agreement with him when he writes :

> 'The challenge to Christianity is clear enough : it is a challenge to endure, as all that is vital endures, by change of form : and even though it entails the merging of Christian faith and Christian experience once more into the flowing river of truth, the realities of spirit are in no danger. Christianity has nothing to fear if she has faith in herself' (p. 337).

This expression of faith in the future of the Christian religion seems however to be weakened, if not actually confuted, by the following passage :

> 'There is no place for "once for all" in the cosmos as we see it to-day . . . no unique and final revelation of God, and no faith once for all committed to the Saints. Man is but an infant, recently arrived on this speck of the material universe; with a billion or so of years of evolution still before him. For my part, I cannot believe that in a corner of this particular planet, 1,900 years ago, the evolution of life attained its goal — the Perfect and Complete Being, the Absolute Standard, the Divinely-sealed Pattern of Life, to which mankind must conform during the countless ages in front of him. Such finality is a tyranny' (p. 333*f*).

In our view there are two distinctive marks of the Christian religion : (1) That it owes all that is essential in it to Jesus Christ, and that (2) that essential element in it is final. We believe that He made a unique contribution in the unveiling of the Divine Nature and Will, and that this unveiling is final in the sense that being essentially true it must be final. According to the theories of some of our evolutionists, a final religion ought to have come only at the close of human history. Yet why should this be the case? A study of human history will show that finality has been reached on many occasions in the earlier stages of human evolution—if by finality we mean the inability to surpass achievement in that department. Did not the Greek sculptors in their presentation of the human form attain finality in the fourth century B.C.? Did not the mediaeval architects attain finality in their Gothic cathedrals? Is modern comedy superior

to the comedies of Aristophanes? Or modern eloquence superior to that of Demosthenes or Cicero? Are twentieth century sonnets superior to those of Shakespeare, Milton and Wordsworth? The disconcerted evolutionist may exclaim in the words of the American satirist: 'It hadn't ought to be.'

But the disconcerted evolutionist cannot stop there if he be a true scientist and not a mere *a priori* theorist. He has to restate his theory of evolution to include these facts. Although we hold that there is good reason for believing in the evolution of religion, we hold that there is equally good reason for believing in the unique character of the Christian religion and that this uniqueness possesses essential finality.

The unique character of the Christian religion is shown in this, among other characteristics, that it combines finality with the power of development. The Christian religion is final in its first principles or fundamentals or essentials, but it is evolutionary in its expansion of those principles and in their manifold practical application to the moral and spiritual needs of an ever-changing environment. If he be a good Christian Modernist this must be Col. Luard's conviction, and the right understanding of it should solve his dilemma.

We have to plead that we have not felt that Col. Luard is entirely happy in another of his statements. He writes:

> 'The national Church might be the soul of the British race, its inner light and the embodiment of its creative spirit: it might make its own distinctive contribution to world unity and growing truth. But it would then no longer claim Divine authority for its doctrine. . . .'

We agree entirely with the first part of this quotation, but the view expressed in its concluding sentence, that the English Church of the future will not claim Divine authority, is for us incredible. If that Church believes that it is teaching the truth it must claim Divine authority for its teaching, for in the Christian view, whether it be that of St. John or of John Milton, truth is divine; and moral and spiritual truth, the most divine of all kinds of truth. It is just because the Church claims to hold and propagate this truth against all objections and opponents that the Church claims Divine authority for its teaching. We are convinced that Col. Luard must believe this though he seems to contradict it.

But although the Christian Church is by its office a teacher of Divine truth, it has no right to assume infallible airs; for history shows that it has again and again taught falsehood in the name of God. Nothing therefore that it teaches is above criticism or immune from investigation. This undoubtedly is the point which Col. Luard wishes to stress, and the Church of England is with him. Edmund Burke wrote: 'The Church of England is a church professing fallibility.' And yet we may add *mirabile dictu*—the Church of England is by its office a teacher of Divine Truth.

There are two further observations demanded.

(1) That the Christian Reformation, so needful for the dawning age, is fraught with enormous difficulty and cannot be made at the pace enthusiasts demand. 'A mile a minute means disaster,' to quote the Prime Minister in another connection. The motto of our New Reformation must be *Festina Lente*, 'He that goes slowly goes surely, and he that goes surely goes far.' The reason for this slowness is that the New Reformation has to be carried on if possible without splitting the Church.

(2) That the Christian Reformation needs the whole-hearted co-operation of all men and women possessed of enlightenment and good-will both inside and outside the Church. That is why it is incumbent on all English Modernists not only to remain in the Church, but to do all they can to work through the existing Church institutions and co-operate in the public life of the Church. By this policy they can best save the nation, the Church and themselves. We cannot but feel that instead of declining to go to church it would be far better for them to follow the example of one of the great fathers of English Modernism, S. T. Coleridge, who wrote after an adventurous and agonising spiritual voyage:

> 'Tis sweeter far to me,
> To walk together to the kirk
> With a goodly company,
>
> To walk together to the kirk,
> And all together pray.'

An Attempt to Liberalize Anglo-Catholicism.[1]

Mr. Kenneth Ingram, founder and editor of the *Green Quarterly*, the author of a large number of volumes on ecclesiastical and social problems, is eminently worth reading by those English Churchmen who cling to the belief that the English Church has a great part to play in the future development of the English people, if only she interprets that part rightly and learns how to play it.

Mr. Kenneth Ingram is a vigorous and outspoken Liberal Anglo-Catholic who is as uncompromising in his loyalty to Catholicism as in his loyalty to Liberalism. What a strain this dual loyalty constitutes, few can realize who have not striven to practise it, since Catholicism and Liberalism in almost every stage of Christian history are found confronting each other in acute opposition.

There is no need here to expound Mr. Kenneth Ingram's Catholicism. Suffice it to say that it is of the English, not of the Roman type. He himself expounds it at length in his book *The Church of To-morrow*. What is of more significance is to present his exposition of his religious Liberalism. In the same volume he writes, and we shall best do him justice by quoting him *verbatim*:

> 'The simplest explanation is to say that liberalism is an attitude of mind, a mode of thinking, rather than a doctrinal system. Religious liberalism is that attitude of mind which seeks to discover what stumbling-blocks between religion and modern thought can be removed without the sacrifice of essential principles. It is animated by a desire to bridge the gulf between Church and world, where possible. It does this, not in the interests of a merely opportunist policy, but because it believes that religion should be essentially evolutionary, and that it will gain, and not lose, by attempting to think in the language of the age.
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> 'The mind of the Church should, indeed, be nothing less than the intelligent religious thought of each generation.
>
> 'Institutional religion, and particularly Catholicism, has been governed, however, in the main by a very different spirit. The anti-liberal still imagines religion to be static — static in form as well as in idea. To him loyalty to the Church involves a refusal to budge an inch from the standpoint of his forefathers . . .

[1] *The Church of To-morrow*, by Kenneth Ingram. Philip Allan and Co. 6/- (1931).
Modern Thought on Trial, by Kenneth Ingram. Philip Allan and Co. 8/6 (1933).
Christianity: Right or Left? by Kenneth Ingram. George Allen and Unwin. 6/- (1937).

'The enthusiasm of the anti-liberal seems to be directed towards emphasizing the commitments of the creed in such a way as to prevent the slightest reconciliation between modern thought and ecclesiastical allegiance. If the illiberals of our day had lived in the time of St. Paul, they would certainly have resisted the policy of admitting the uncircumcized into the Christian community . . .

'We can only appreciate the motive of the illiberal mind if we realize that its conception of religion is essentially static and unchangeable. Liberals, on the contrary, regard religion as something which is always changing and developing. They recognize, in fact, that certain changes are legitimate, because they are able to distinguish between the truths of religion, and the form in which they are explained, or, still more, between truths and rules of discipline. They do not desire change merely for the sake of novelty. They are not anxious merely to compromise their faith in order to curry favour with the uncircumcized Gentile. They are ready to re-interpret their creed precisely because their faith in the width and profundity of truth is so sure that they do not fear to injure the truth by altering its form. They are not animated by the desire to make terms with modern thought at all costs. But they are conscious that modern thought is itself a channel of revelation, and that the truth which they hold will benefit and will be revivified by the contribution of modern thought . . .

'The Church, if she is to live, must be the pioneer of modern thought. If her function is only to build an embankment round her waters, it may mean that she has ceased to be an influence in the main stream of life, and that her waters have become stagnant.'

We must add to these longer quotations from Mr. Kenneth Ingram some briefer aphorisms of his which seem to be truly golden:

'The rock on which a faith is built is truth. There is no other rock.'

'. . . human intellectual activity is the sacramental method through which the Holy Spirit guides the Church into all truth.'

'The monopoly theory [of an absolutist catholicism] . . . is merely the result of an undeveloped mentality . . . the Catholic principle which we are considering is distinct from the monopoly claim . . . With the monopoly claim, as we have seen, the liberal attitude must be in direct conflict.'

'The Church must justify herself as the Catholic Church, rather than a sect, by this ability to include.'

'I believe the internal Anglican situation would be immensely relieved by the emergence of a liberalized outlook in the Catholic mentality.'

'Romanization . . . has no reality so far as Liberal Catholics are concerned, for it represents the intellectual antithesis of their most cherished convictions.'

Of 'comprehensiveness' Mr. Kenneth Ingram writes:

'The common basis of agreement would involve a fundamental unity. In other words, the personnel of the Church would be essentially Catholic, if we have enough imagination to conceive that Catholi-

cism could take not only an Anglo-Catholic, but an Evangelical and Modernist form.

'The suggestion that Catholicism can be expressed only in one form seems to me to involve a curiously inadequate idea of the Catholic religion.'

There is no English Modernist who will not heartily agree with Mr. Kenneth Ingram's exposition of Liberal Catholicism. It is, we believe, identical with English Modernism. If the Anglo-Catholic party as a whole could be won to these ideals, the problem of party antagonisms within the Church of England would secure solution. We do not here affirm that all English Modernists would be in complete agreement with all the features of Mr. Kenneth Ingram's ideal of Catholicism; but that would not matter, at least from their point of view, for with the Catholicism which is Liberal, as with the Evangelicalism which is Liberal, Modernists can have no quarrel. They recognize that uniformity of doctrine, like uniformity of ritual and uniformity of ecclesiastical organization, are neither necessary nor possible nor even desirable in the Church of England. So long as the essential centre of Christian faith and fellowship and worship is secured, the variable circumference matters little.

There is another side to Mr. Kenneth Ingram's Liberal Catholicism. It is concerned with economics, social organization and international politics. He expands it in his latest volume, *Christianity: Right or Left?* Here, all Modernists who are followers of F. D. Maurice and Hastings Rashdall—and there can be few who are not—will be in agreement with Mr. Kenneth Ingram in holding that the Christian religion cannot regard these fields of human activity as lying outside its sphere. To-day at any rate we all feel increasingly bound as Christians to do all in our power to realize the ideals of economic justice, social betterment, political freedom and the League of Nations. The ideals are agreed upon—that is no small achievement, and we owe a debt of gratitude to those who have achieved this—but the method by which these ideals are to be implemented is one of acute controversy to-day. Mr. Kenneth Ingram favours strongly the methods of the Left; others favour the methods of the Right. We favour the *via media*. The policy of 'gradualness' which Mr. Kenneth Ingram scorns is in harmony with the British temper and method and has no small record of achieve-

ment to its credit. It is for the progressive development of a Christian Commonwealth based upon the spirit of justice, humanity and freedom that we work, and our aim is to achieve it, not by force, but by education, not by revolution but by scientific experiment. These methods we believe are sanctioned as much by the Christian religion as they are dictated by British commonsense.

However, we are not here primarily concerned with Mr. Kenneth Ingram's economic, social and political programme, but with his religious Liberalism. What we have desired to do in this article is to direct attention to the very valuable and courageous practical work which Mr. Kenneth Ingram has done and is doing in the cause of Church unity by pleading with Anglo-Catholics for a sympathetic understanding of Modernist motives and ideals and so paving the way for closer co-operation.

It is a matter of deep regret to us, although of no great surprise, that Mr. Kenneth Ingram's magazine, *The Green Quarterly*, is ceasing publication because of insufficient support.

TOWARDS A NEW TECHNIQUE

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

FAR more important than the controversy between Arius and Athanasius was that between Augustine and Pelagius. The Arian controversy was concerned with God, but the Pelagian controversy with Man. Disputes about the nature of God must always remain more or less theoretical, but about Man some measure of scientific knowledge is possible. Moreover our view of human nature affects our whole outlook. The division between Authoritarian and Liberal, which is the division that counts for most to-day in every sphere, springs from a difference of opinion about the nature of man. The authoritarian, like St. Augustine, declares that it is not in human nature to behave itself; it must be governed and disciplined into decency. The liberal view, on the other hand, is that human nature is decent enough if left alone and not corrupted by effete institutions and by unfavourable conditions, economic and political. Never was

the issue between these two opposing points of view more bitter than at present, when Europe seems to be slipping back into the epoch of wars of religion. The two ideologies, Authoritarian and Liberal, confront one another, each resolved to make good its claim to be the future guide of humanity.

In this controversy the Church has been on the side of Augustine; it has been definitely and uncompromisingly authoritarian. Theoretically, the authority it has sought to impose upon men has been 'of God'; but in practice it has generally been 'of men.' The Church has stood in with the political and economic authoritarian; it has been of the party of the Right, facing the Liberal of the Left. That there have been Christian left-minded idealists like Saint Simon, Lamennais, Maurice, and others is true. But they have been a minority, and, in spite of what is said, an impotent minority, and have exercised about as much influence upon policy as has the Social Democrat in Hitlerite Germany, or the Trotskyist in Stalinite Russia. The Church as a whole has remained emphatically Augustinian and authoritarian.

That it should be so is inevitable. If man can work out his own salvation, as Pelagius taught, where does the priest come in? According to the Augustinian theory a priesthood is an essential transmitting mechanism of sacramental grace, apart from which man is doomed to perdition. The Church's whole position rests upon the Augustinian, authoritarian theory. Why on earth, then, should the Church repudiate it? Such repudiation would be equivalent to committing suicide. For the Church, the Liberal always has been, and remains, the enemy. Rousseau is Anti-Christ.

All this would be generally admitted—it is indeed the commonplace of every political writer, and it would hardly be worth while to repeat truisms save to lead up to something more interesting. The point now is that the scientists, who have hitherto been emphatically upon the Liberal, Pelagian, side in the battle, now seem to be standing in with the Authoritarian, Augustinian, army. Here lies the fresh feature in the present situation—*the Liberal cause seems to be weakening by the defection of the scientists*, hitherto the advance-guard of Liberalism, the air-force of the Left.

It would take too long to trace the precise history of this defection — if we are to call it such. It began with Darwin's *Origin of Species*, continued with the Eugenists, and ended with the doctrines of Freud. Liberalism, as Professor Hogben has pointed out, is based upon *physical* science, which, like death, is egalitarian (there is no such thing as rank amongst triangles, and the force of gravity controls alike kings, convicts and bankers).[1] But the newer science of biology affords no such secure basis for that theory, and psychology has undermined the complacent Liberal faith in human nature. Freud may be a new Anti-Christ, but at least he has put the old Anti-Christ, Rousseau, with his optimistic anthropology, out of action. It may be necessary to modify in some respects the theories of Freud, as it has been necessary in some respects to modify the theories of both Newton and Darwin. But there is now no more possibility of a return to pre-Freudian psychology than there is of a return to pre-Newtonian physics or pre-Darwinian biology.

Reinforced, then, by the adhesion of the scientists, is the Authoritarianism of the Church going to return in full force? Is the priest going to climb into the saddle again — that saddle from which he was dislodged by Rousseau and the Liberals? The priest has always been quick to seize his chances, is he not pretty sure to make good use of this one? And will Freud consent to hold his stirrup for him?

Such a contingency is quite possible. Indeed, there are clear indications already of a strong Right-ward reaction, motivated in part by fears of a social upheaval, but also by a quite genuine disillusionment with human nature, which certainly has, in recent decades, disappointed expectations. And there is no doubt that everyone (except perhaps the extreme Left wing) would welcome the return of the priest if they thought there was a reasonable chance of his being able to regenerate us effectively. Indeed the priest has been out of the saddle so long that people are apt to have forgotten what a poor horseman he is, and how little can really be expected of him. After all, the priest had a

[1] There is the story about Wellington and the private soldier at the Lord's Table. 'We are all equal here,' said the Duke. They would also have been equal as subjects for experiment in a physical laboratory — or in an earthquake.

long run — several centuries — and human nature remained unchanged. What good reason is there to suppose that he will do any better in the future than he has done in the past, if we renew our lost confidence in him? He will only make the same blunders, and we shall have to liquidate him over again.

We know what the priest's methods have been, and there is no reason to suppose that he has found reason to change them in his period of retirement, during which it is only too likely that he has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. We need not examine those methods at any length; they are based on a particular theory of human nature involving two axioms: (1) that to change his nature man needs supernatural aid from sacraments, and (2) that the primary defect in man's nature, the *fons et origo mali*, is the sexual impulse.

As for the first axiom, we need not attribute supernatural efficacy to sacraments to explain their working; they work quite simply through mass suggestion — though one particular sacrament, that of Penance, works through individual suggestion, and is the most effective of the lot in influencing behaviour. As for the second axiom, it is of course quite true that the sexual impulse, or rather the *Libido*, to use Freudian terminology, is the source of all evil in man. But the trouble is that it is the source of all the good, too, so that if you suppress it (as the priest aims at doing, his line being one of repression), you suppress everything, for the *libido* is the individual's vital core. Thus the priest's prescription cures vice by curing vitality; it is as if one should safeguard a man from accidents by inoculating him with paralysis. Of course, human nature being what it is, the priest's attempts to quell the *libido* are generally unsuccessful. But even so, it cannot be denied that much harm is done, and many unnecessary neuroses inflicted upon the unwary.

As compared with the Liberal—the disciple of Pelagius and Rousseau—the priest is of course right. The psychologist bears him out in his contention that man is by nature neither rational nor moral. Reason and Society seem to be acquisitions — tools to enable the human species to cope with its environment and overcome its animal rivals. But though the priest and the psychologist agree in their estimate of human nature, their agreement ends at this point. Their respective methods of dealing with

human nature are fundamentally diverse from one another. The priest thinks that the fundamental instinctive nature of man is not to be trusted, but relentlessly suppressed with the assistance of supernatural medicine. The psychologist, on the other hand, believes that it is quite possible to educate this non-rational, instinctive core, which is the source of all vice and all virtue. The educator who has freed himself from the age-old prejudices of the priest holds that at all costs vigour and vitality must be preserved, and that a virtue which sacrifices these is simply not worth while, but is a mutilation—a degradation even—of human nature.

It must be admitted that the Liberal in his dealing with human nature has been almost as bad as the priest, though he has gone about the business of corrupting youth in a different way. He has attempted to weaken the vital, instinctive core of the individual, not so much by deliberately suppressing it, as by starving it and by diverting all nutriment in another direction. The Liberal has deliberately encouraged hypertrophy of the intellect; he it is who is responsible for our ultra-cerebral, bookish, idea-mongering education. The Liberal, quite rightly, respects the intellect; but he altogether fails to see that the strength of the intellect, as of everything else in the human make-up, depends upon the vitality of the instinctive core without which a man is a cardboard figure. Thus if the priest rears neurotics, the Liberal breeds clever, information-stuffed, self-opinionated, instinct-starved prigs. Is it not the just Nemesis of the Liberal's ideals of education that now, after they have been practised for two generations, the product should be what we see around us in Europe? We have an educated public tumbling over itself to submit to mass emotion. These victims of the Liberal technique have no intractable, insoluble, irreducible core to their being. They have minds; but inasmuch as they have no individuality, those minds are easily captured and hypnotized. They seek a Man, a Leader, to compensate themselves for their lost manhood!

Now what is needed is to pension off both the priest and the 'cerebral' or bookish educator. They have been tried and found wanting. We need an entirely new technique based on new and scientific theories of human nature which will have nothing in

common with the pessimism of the priest or the intellectualism of the Liberal.

We may note that our 'totalitarian' educators are already busy developing an efficient technique for educating the *instincts*. And what instincts! Pugnacity, tribal fervour, contempt for the weak, cruelty, and so on. They do not fall into the error of the Liberal, and strive to starve the instinctive life; they foster it, in all its worst aspects! They want to see the rising generation lusty and vigorous, full of *libido*, and of unimpaired vitality. And are the totalitarians to be left in possession of the field?

Neither the priest, with his technique of suppressing the instincts, nor the Liberal with his technique of starving them, will do any good here; both alike will be swamped and smothered, and deservedly. So long as the children of light are inferior in vitality to the children of darkness (even if they are more 'moral' and intellectual) they will be beaten by them. It is sheer vitality which counts. The Christians beat the Pagans in the first centuries of our era because they had vitality. A man like Tertullian was not a mere intellectual or a highbrow. Still less was he a dilettante; and the same remark applies to Augustine, Jerome, Athanasius, and Ambrose. Then the Counter-Reformation derived its strength from the vitality of a man like Ignatius Loyola. These men had brains; but it was the drive behind the brains that carried them through.

Now is it possible to devise a technique to educate the instincts — and the right instincts, not the wrong ones, as do the totalitarians? Is it possible, without checking vitality, to educate the co-operative instinct instead of the competitive, and the creative instinct instead of the acquisitive? And is it possible to eliminate altogether the most debilitating of all the instincts, fear; which instinct the priest has never failed to exploit?

The new technique for training human nature which will take the place of the discredited techniques of the priest and the pre-Freudian Liberal will be based upon one principle — that whatever happens, the instinctive core of the individual must not be weakened. The *libido*, the vital energy-generator, is sacred.

The *libido* can be fatally injured without actually being stamped upon by some stupid if well-intentioned suppressor of the instincts. Far more often the damage is done (as we have

seen) by gently draining off its energies—generally by sucking it dry to feed the brain. It can also be weakened by surreptitiously introduced fears, which have the effect, not of diverting energy, but of dividing and immobilizing it. What is overlooked in English educational circles is the possibility of weakening the individual's central vital core by athleticism. Any practice which diverts energy in excess, whether to brain or body, is bad. A healthy, vigorous *libido* is not to be produced by forcing on the body any more than by forcing on the mind. A healthy body is good; but what is usually overlooked is the indisputable fact that the health of the body depends more upon the health of the central core, the *libido*, than upon anything else (given sufficient food, shelter, warmth, and so on). Both the moral and physical benefits of organized games have been exaggerated. Individual vitality is no more to be guaranteed by athleticism than by intellectualism; both alike are perversions because they are both exaggerations of some aspect of human activity.

What has been overlooked in English education has been *art*—not (God forbid) the art of the art-room and music-room as usually found in schools, where these things are regarded as 'accomplishments' or extras, not to be taken seriously—but something far more spontaneous. Most children up to the age of eight or thereabouts are fond of painting, drawing, modelling, 'craft' work, and so on. But the whole thing is scrapped later in favour of books and games. Our educational system in this respect is indeed a reflection of our fundamental barbarism.

It is perhaps unnecessary to add that religion in our schools of all descriptions is in about the same position as art. The religion of the school chapel is too often of the same grade as the art of the art-room. There is little spontaneity about it; it is formal, artificial, and segregated. The prayers are too much like models for freehand drawing. And yet art and religion are the great trainers of the instincts. Can a technique be worked out for using these great human activities, so atrophied to-day, to help the *libido* to grow in the right direction?

THE RELIGION OF HEALTHY-MINDEDNESS

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THE last century witnessed the advance of scientific knowledge of the material world, and the breakdown of the traditional doctrines of creation which came through that advance. For a time leaders of theological thought were inclined to resist this advance. For a time many whose religious thought had moved in the traditional channels felt that a breach had been made in their religious faith, and that that faith must in consequence be abandoned. Gradually it became clear that the grander picture of the world which was given in evolutionary theories need not militate against the belief in God. Our reverence for the hidden glory of the Creator becomes the greater as we acquire a grander knowledge of the natural world in which His hidden hand is revealed. Thus the new knowledge was baptized into the setting of the traditional faith; many have now found that that faith was for them enriched through the open acceptance of the new knowledge.

The present century is witnessing the advance of scientific enquiry into the realm of the human and into the realm of the mind of man. The same processes of observation and rational enquiry, which have won such conquests over the lower orders of nature, are now applied to the psychology of the individual and of men in groups and crowds. Already there are signs that some leaders of theology resent what seems a further intrusion into their field. For some once more the new knowledge may cause at first a dimming of ancient faith. It is a common religious tendency to feel that the work of God must necessarily be shrouded in mystery, and that every advance in knowledge means a diminution in the religious approach toward God. We may hope and expect that ultimately once more the new knowledge will be baptized into the ancient faith; that that faith will be established and enriched from a closer, wiser knowledge of

the laws of the human mind. Meanwhile, it would seem probable that we are on the threshold, and indeed in the midst, of a new tension between religion and science; it is moreover likely to prove even more acute than the tension over evolution, because in dealing with the psychological world the scientific method has come nearer to the essential field of religious thought and life.

For these reasons it is essential to face clearly the inter-relation of religion and psychology at this time. The intellectual presentation of religion must come to terms with the scientific knowledge of the mind of man, if it is to retain the assent of those who move forward with the advancing tide of knowledge. This synthesis of religion and psychology is even more important for another reason. It is urgent not only on theoretic, but also on practical and pastoral grounds. There is coming in the various schools of modern psychology a new understanding of the laws of the health of the soul, and a new treatment and cure of those who have fallen into moral and spiritual ill-health. In this practical work, the new schools of psychology must necessarily become rivals of religion, unless they are welcomed as allies. If the new learning is excluded by the religious, we may see the emergence of a new lay priesthood specializing in the healing of souls. If the new learning is welcomed as an ally, then we may expect an advance of immense benefit for the realization of the full and healthy life. Through the last century the theory and the practice of the health of body has made an immense advance; we have now classified and learnt the cure for the majority of the physical evils to which the body of man is heir, and we have placed this knowledge at the disposal of rich and poor alike in all civilized countries. We urgently need, and we may look to find, a similar advance in the theory and practice of health of mind in the coming years.

These considerations on the importance of the inter-relation of religion and psychology may serve to lead us toward an understanding of their synthesis. The two methods of thought and life cover a common sphere. More strictly, we should say that psychology covers a ground which is coterminous with part of that covered by religion. The field of religion is wider. Religion points the individual beyond the limits of his own inner life toward the existence of a spiritual world of which he

is one member amongst many. It raises on the intellectual side questions of ultimate metaphysic as to the nature and existence of God. Further, religion points the individual away from himself toward the existence of fellow-men, and his rights and responsibilities toward them. It raises at this point questions of ethics and of social justice. As Christians we believe that we find in Christ the answer to these questions concerning the nature of God and of the good life between man and man. We therefore seem to prejudge questions which come close to the psychological study of health of soul, but which strictly lie beyond the immediate limits of that study.

Besides these wider questions, however, religion also is concerned with the inner spiritual life of the individual. The whole range of thought and life covered by soteriology is identical with the field covered by modern psychology. In each we are concerned to discover the nature of the human soul in its sickness and its health, and the laws of its recovery from sickness to health. In this respect psychology is not a new science; it is rather a new scientific approach to a field of life which has long been open to human investigation. The leaders of psychology would of course themselves recognize this. They are dealing with a field which has already been observed and worked over by all who have lived deeply, and who have studied human nature through intensive introspection or acute study of their fellow-men. Both amongst religious saints and mystics, and amongst the great novelists and dramatists, we may find portrayed the same fundamental laws and processes which are now becoming the subject-matter for the new scientific psychological schools.

Religion and psychology have not only a common sphere of interest and work; they have also a common desire in their approach to that sphere. The interest of the student of psychology is not only to understand; it is also to help and to heal. The great recent advance in psychology was immensely stimulated through the claim on men's sympathy of the cases of nervous breakdown through the strain of the war. The endeavour to heal the cases of breakdown led to a rapid advance in the knowledge of the laws of mental health, which was in turn applied to other cases of neurotic breakdown, and then more recently to more

slight and normal cases of mental ill-health. This desire to help and to heal is obviously close to the Christian ethic of forgiveness. The ethical approach to personality in religion sets a standard of goodness and demands that men shall conform to this standard. At times, therefore, religion leaves men judging and blaming those who thus fail to conform. If we are true to the mind of Christ, we shall not rest in this spirit of moral judgment. We may not blame the sinner for an evil life unless we take upon ourselves the full responsibility for aiding the sinner with wise understanding to grow into a good life. We are disciples of a Master who 'came not to judge but to save'; when we realize the implications of that discipleship, we approach the sinful with that same desire for their restoration and well-being, which is characteristic of the psychological approach.

This synthesis between religion and psychology is obscured by the different terminology of the two fields. Here a difficulty arises which may require a period of patient adjustment. On the one side, the new technical vocabulary of psychology, besides being varied in different schools, is also strange to those who have not studied any of these schools. The unfamiliarity of the language may make the new learning seem more remote from traditional religious thought and life than is in fact the case. On the other side, the theological language is strange and remote to those who have not learnt this approach to the life of the soul. Moreover on this side we must reluctantly admit that the inner meaning of the language is often obscured by its actual use. Such terms as redemption and justification and salvation in their origin are intimately related to the process of the conversion of a sick personality into new health; when the terms are used in conventional ways in liturgy or text-book, by those who have not themselves been through such a process of conversion, they are given a debased and formal content removed from the inner spiritual processes to which they properly refer. Their subjective significance is then obscured; to the psychologists, they seem more remote from their field of study than is in fact the case. A barrier is thus set up which will necessarily be greatest for those whose thought is moving in a realm of words, and who have not properly related these words to the underlying realities for which they stand. We shall need in the

coming years people who can act as interpreters between these two sets of vocabularies, just as we need interpreters between two different languages. These interpreters must be people of deep experience, who have intimate acquaintance through introspection and observation of the inner working of the human soul, and who can therefore use with freedom of mind a varying vocabulary, because at heart they know and understand and care not for vocabulary but for spiritual reality.

Let us illustrate this common spiritual reality behind a varying vocabulary at two central points in the thought and practice of soteriology, the Fall and the Atonement. In the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (p. 309) Freud writes:

> 'I believe that a large portion of the mythological conception of the world which reaches far into the most modern religions is nothing but psychology projected into the outer world. The dim perception of psychic factors and relations of the unconscious was taken as a model in the constitution of transcendental reality, which is destined to be changed again by science into a psychology of the unconscious . . . We venture to explain in this way the myths of Paradise and the Fall, of God, of Good and Evil, of Immortality and the Life.'

In thus taking the Fall story as a mythical expression of unconscious spiritual relationships, he is nearer to orthodoxy than he himself seems to recognize. Professor N. P. Williams writes similarly of the Fall in his Bampton Lectures:

> 'Considered historically and with regard to the circumstances of its origin, the theory of the Fall and of Original Sin does not rest upon the Paradise story of Genesis III. Its true foundations are psychological, based on bed-rock facts of ethical and spiritual experience.'

Here we have common ground in regarding man as fallen in the depths of his psychic life; and we may find further agreement in the analysis of his disorder. One of the root principles in the psychological analysis of the personality is the repression of unwelcome truth in the unconscious, at the bidding of an ideal of the self, which would be offended by the acceptance of this material. Thus Franz Alexander writes in *Psycho-analysis To-day* (p. 18):

> 'This phenomenon is most satisfactorily described by saying that one part of the personality exhibits fear and another part, which in ordinary language is called conscience, and that repression serves to avert this fear reaction. In other words, those mental tendencies, wishes, longings, ideas, are excluded from the conscious personality as would arouse self-condemnation if they entered consciousness, for this self-condemnation is associated with fear like that experienced in the face of real danger.'

The resulting conflict is precisely that described in Pauline theology in the seventh chapter of *Romans* as the conflict between the law and the mind of the flesh: 'So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.' The spiritual state of the repressed soul is precisely that described by Our Lord in His attack on Pharisaism (*Matt.* xxiii, 25):

> 'Ye make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but within ye are full of extortion and excess . . . Ye are like whited sepulchres which indeed appear beautiful outwardly, but within are full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness. Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity.'

To the discerning eye there is agreement in New Testament soteriology and modern psychology as to the nature of the repressed personality. We turn to the Atonement. In each there is similarly agreement that it is forgiveness which is necessary for the cure. The false exacting standard, which has made the person unwilling to accept in his conscious mind his own real nature, must yield and be replaced by the new ideal of mercy. This is what happens in the Pauline conversion. Through this, his whole thought henceforth resounds with the one message of the forgiveness of God in Christ. 'By grace are ye saved through faith, not of works, lest any man should boast.' This acceptance of forgiveness is precisely the healing method of analysis, in the talking out of areas of shameful memory in an environment of love. The new doctors of the soul may not have related their healing method to the traditional theology of Atonement; when we look not at words but at realities, we see that it is in fact the forgiving love of God which they are seeking to proclaim. Jung writes of his work, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (p. 270):

> 'The patient does not feel himself accepted unless the very worst in him has been accepted too.'

Dr. Ernest Jones writes of the method of analysis (p. 322):

> 'Anyone hearing of the treatment for the first time almost invariably asks at this point what is done next after the patient is made aware of his buried mental processes, and on being told that nothing is done, is naturally puzzled to understand wherein lies the value of the procedure.'

The answer is that it is precisely this acceptance in consciousness of all that is worst in our nature which is the goal of health. It was the attempt to disclaim our real nature which was an

evasion of individual responsibility and therein both sin and sickness of the soul. The proclamation of the forgiveness of God makes it possible for us to appear as sinful in His presence; it makes unnecessary the repression of evil memory and the effortful strain after goodness. The paradox becomes true, that the moment in which we accept responsibility for the evil within us is the moment in which that evil loses its terror and its power. The method of psychotherapy is at one with the Pauline paradox of Grace.

Enough has been said to suggest how closely traditional theology and recent psychology are related beneath their difference of language. Let us, in closing, notice two places where they may come into conflict as the new scientific approach is extended. These two places are the portrait of the good life, and faith in the Transcendent God. In the first place, we shall have to explore far more fully what is the goal of health, alike for the individual and for society. The school of Adler has perhaps given more attention to this synthetic constructive side. From the Christian point of view, we must welcome every attempt to achieve a more thorough scientific presentation of the goal of healthy living. At the same time we must also maintain that in Christ we already see the finisher as the author of our faith. The conflict here is one which is essential to the dynamic nature of the Christian faith. We are facing at a deeper point a perpetual conflict, that we claim in Christ to know the goal of Christian life, and yet that each generation and each individual must seek and explore, through doubt and error, in order to inherit the Christ-life in their own thought and experience. In the psychology of character, we must both admit full liberty for exploration and yet at the same time maintain that we already know in Christ the goal to which such exploration must lead.

More seriously, the advance of scientific psychology will lead once more to conflict round the central Christian faith in transcendent, personal, self-existent, self-revealing God. The advance of scientific knowledge into the realm of religious experience is bound for a time to throw the reality of such experience into question. We make the whole experience a matter for objective and critical examination; we thereby throw doubt on the simple faith that there is in such experience an objective

awareness of God. We shall find in the examination of the religious life how deeply conceptions of God are coloured by early relationships to parents. Inevitably it will seem that the transcendent reality of God has been questioned, as well as our thought about His nature. It will seem that the existence of God is a projection of our own consciousness upon an empty world. Here is the central issue. It is extremely probable that for many years ahead the psychological approach will seem to lead to agnosticism. It is well that those of us who both believe in God, and desire to accept the new learning with open mind and welcome its lessons for pastoral work, should face this issue openly at an early stage, and think our way through to clarity upon it.

We may then suggest, as we suggested at the outset of this paper, that the ultimate solution will be to clear away false, unworthy conceptions of the deity, and to leave a true faith in God purified and enriched. Nay more, we may suggest that at the end theology will prove necessary to correct the abuses of a one-sided psychology. The danger of psychology, as of any new science, is that it isolates a section of experience and seeks to interpret all reality within its own limited terms. The danger may in this instance become acute for health of soul, since it is the inner life of the soul which is here the field singled out for selection. It is a law of health that we should not be over-preoccupied with our health; and if this law is true of our bodies, it is still more true of our minds. A measure of deep introspection is healthy. In reasserting the healing powers of analysis, psychology is but reasserting the time-honoured truth that a full life is a life which has undergone rigorous self-examination. To be preoccupied with the state of our own souls is, however, far from healthy. The goal of healthy life is to be found in extroversion rather than in introversion. The goal of health is to be found in a rich and free enjoyment of the world external to us, and in an active out going life within that world. It is here that theology with its wider field may provide the corrective for a one-sided psychology. It points us to a spiritual world transcending our own spiritual life; it points us to claims upon our attention and our time and our love, from our neighbour and from the world in which our lives are set. In hearing and

meeting these claims from the external world, we shall find a health which we should never find through a mere preoccupation with our own spiritual state. Theology rightly includes the examination of our own soul in the wider setting of the service of our neighbour and the adoration of God. In the worship of God and in out-going love of neighbour we shall find a salvation of soul which we should never find so long as we made the health of our own soul a matter for direct pursuit.

THE PERMANENT AND THE PASSING IN THE PAULINE GOSPEL

By H. D. A. Major, D.D., F.S.A.

ST. Paul was one of the world's most influential personalities. That personality was the outcome of no ordinary origin, environment, education and religious experience. He possessed the emotion of a poet, the organizing ability of a pro-consul, the moral feeling of a prophet, the courage and physical endurance of a gladiator, the religious asceticism of a saint, the sanity of a man of the world — such is St. Paul, the founder of the Catholic or Universal Church of Christ, as he stands out in his Epistles and in the Acts of the Apostles.

If any man's life was ever sharply divided into two parts it was the life of St. Paul — the zealot for Jewish legalism and the fanatical persecutor of an anti-legalist movement within it of which persecuted movement St. Paul afterwards became the champion. This movement was initiated by Jesus of Nazareth and carried forward by Stephen at whose execution St. Paul had presided. It was St. Paul's conversion which sharply separated his life into two parts, and had it not been for that conversion we should know nothing to-day of St. Paul; for it was by his liberation of his native religion from legalism, from being a religion of ordinances, of ceremonies and sacrifices, that St. Paul contributed an asset of permanent value in the evolution of religion and gave it the power to become universal. He was, however, not original in this part of his Gospel. It came from

Jesus, as St. Paul proclaimed, 'With freedom did Christ set us free: stand fast therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage' (*Gal.* v, 1).

St. Paul's permanent and original contribution in this sphere of religious liberation is seen in his presentation of Christianity as the Religion of the Spirit. It would have been dangerous and detrimental in the extreme to set men free from the discipline of law in religion without directing them to any other guide. St. Paul pointed them to the Spirit of God who could guide men by working through their personality—conscience, mind, spirit—if they were loyal and devoted to Jesus Christ.

What St. Paul exactly meant by the Spirit is a matter of discussion among theologians. The Spirit for St. Paul would seem to have been the Divine life, power, presence, projected by God into His universe, manifest supremely in the personality, activity, and teaching of Jesus Christ: manifest also in the lives of His true disciples: manifest also in the fellowship and corporate activity of the Christian Church. This Spirit received abundantly into the hearts of those who had faith in Jesus Christ, as the supreme unveiling in human history of the presence and power of God, was to them who received it a creative, vital, inspiring, empowering, presence and activity. It enabled those who possessed it not only to know the Divine will, but to do it. 'Walk in the Spirit and ye shall not obey the lusts of the flesh.' It was the gift of the Spirit which made men sons of God—the Spirit of adoption whereby we cry Abba, Father. For, as St. Paul said, 'As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.'

This Pauline doctrine of the Spirit is I believe a permanent element of great value both in the understanding and in the practice of the religious life. It presents the Divine Being in human experience, as 'above all and through all and in all.'

St. Paul's estimate of the supreme religious significance of the personality of Jesus Christ in human history as one in whom the very essence of the Divine Nature, subject to human limitations, is unveiled, is another contribution of permanent value to religion.

I revere many of the great religious leaders, saints, prophets, the founders of religions. I recognize the great services they

have performed for humanity, but I hold Jesus Christ to be superior to them all, not so much in His originality, for much of what He taught is to be found in the teaching of others (although not all of it), but in His power to go to the very heart of what constitutes true religion, and to separate the essence of religion from many other things which religious people have regarded as religious truth. As Adolf Harnack has said.

> 'What characterized the religion of Jesus was not what He included in it but what He excluded from it.'

St. Paul, in his Gospel, recognized this: he rejected all ceremonialism, all ordinances, as not of the essence of true religion. He writes to the *Galatians*:

> 'Ye observe days and months and seasons and years. I am afraid of you lest by any means I have bestowed labour upon you in vain.' *Gal.* iv, 10.

Imagine a Jew, with his intense reverence for the Sabbath and his strict observance of new moons, sabbatical years and so on, writing in this manner.

Again, St. Paul excluded asceticism from his Gospel as did Jesus

> 'But meat will not commend us to God: neither if we eat not are we the worse: nor if we eat are we the better' (*Cor.* viii, 8).
>
> 'The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit' (*Rom.* xiv, 17).

'Have we not the right to lead about with us a sister who is a wife, like Peter, and the other apostles,' is St. Paul's claim, although he declined to exercise the right on account of the character of his apostolic mission. He urged others also, in view of the near approach of the end of the world, not to marry. There was an ascetic strain in St. Paul's nature. He said of himself:

> 'I lead about my body as a slave and beat it black and blue lest after having preached to others, I myself should be a reprobate.'

But he would not make this personal asceticism, exercised in his own case, an essential part of his Gospel or impose it as a necessity upon others.

This exclusion of asceticism from his Gospel St. Paul inherited from Jesus — the Son of man who came eating and drinking and of whom His critics said that He was a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber.

For St. Paul, Love was the basic principle in moral action.

'Love,' said he,

> 'worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.' 'For this thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment it is briefly comprehended in this saying: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (*Rom.* xiii, 9).

Of course this essential principle of the active religious life is superbly expressed in St. Paul's magnificent hymn of Christian love: 'Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels and have not love it profiteth me nothing.

St. Paul, with the great moralists of pagan antiquity, believed in the four cardinal virtues: manly courage, justice, wisdom, self-control, but he crowned them all by the three Christian graces: faith, hope, love. 'Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three, and the greatest of these is love.'

In treating of these permanent elements in the Pauline Gospel I have indicated that they are not original so far as Paul himself was concerned. He owed them, and confessed that he owed them, to Jesus, His Lord and Leader — the Liberator from legalism, formalism, ceremonalism and every form of taboo in the sphere of religion.

I have stressed this relation of Paul to Jesus because in certain circles ever since the rise, more than a century ago, of the Tübingen school of theology, founded by that truly original and courageous thinker, Ferdinand Baur, it has been only too frequently the habit, with radical higher critics of the New Testament and researchers into Christian origins, to represent the Pauline Gospel in its most essential form as something which was largely independent of the original Gospel of Galilee, as Jesus proclaimed it. To-day, we find in Germany, that Dr. Rosenberg, one of the chief protagonists of Herr Hitler's nationalist religious policy, presents Paul as the perverter, almost the antagonist, of the original Gospel of Jesus. In many cases the thought-forms of Jesus and of Paul differed, and as we shall indicate, there are certain features in the Pauline Gospel which are developments of the Gospel of Jesus, and in other cases alien additions to it, but the essential elements in that original Gospel of Jesus are found unperverted in the Gospel of Paul and constitute the most permanent, as also the most precious, elements in it.

I pass now to an original Pauline element in the Pauline Gospel. In my opening words, I described St. Paul as the founder of the Catholic or Universal Church of Christ. This was St. Paul's greatest original contribution to the Christian Religion.

Some may say : but surely the Christian Church was founded by Jesus Christ. No : it was not founded *by* Him but *on* Him. The Church passages in St. Matthew (xvi, 18; xviii, 17) were not uttered by Jesus Christ. The Church did not actually exist during the earthly life of Jesus. Jesus did not call men into the Church : He did not admit them by the rite of Baptism. There was no organized Christian society in His day. He did not say : Be baptized and enter the Church, but : Follow me. And what He called those whom He addressed, was, to discipleship. That is to say, a condition of pupilage : men who were to be taught and trained : and that, with the ultimate purpose of being apostles, that is, delegates or missionaries, sent forth to proclaim the Gospel of Jesus. These disciples or apostles were 'a band of brothers' such, for instance, as were Nelson's captains. They were not an organized society such as is the Christian Church, but a fellowship under the leadership of Jesus Christ.

Paul presented the ideal of a world-wide society which he viewed as the body, through which on earth, the spiritual and exalted Jesus Christ carried forward His mission to mankind. This society, St. Paul pictured, as richly endowed with the Divine Spirit. He uses a curious word *pleroma*, derived possibly from gnostic speculation to present his ideal. The *pleroma* has been defined as 'the totality of the Divine attributes.' This totality of Divine attributes, St. Paul believed to be possessed by Jesus Christ; but of course not in such a way as to deprive the Divine Father of their possession. With this *pleroma* Christ endowed the Church—His body on earth—and every member of this body, subject of course to his own personal limitations, was likewise endowed with this *pleroma*. By the possession of this *pleroma* the Divine Father, the Divine Son, the Church of Christ, and the individual Christian, are all united in a spiritual and moral bond — really a union — all pulsating with the Divine life and energy, co-operating for the salvation of mankind in accordance with the Divine purpose.

This Church is thus universal in its scope. It transcends therefore all distinctions of race, all distinctions of class, all distinctions of sex. There is neither Jew nor Greek, male nor female, barbarian, Scythian, bondman or free man. All are united by the Christ-spirit in them in the Christ-fellowship — the Universal Church. In this Church there is organization, because there are various functions to be performed and suitable moral and spiritual gifts are imparted by the Divine Spirit to the various members of the Church for the performance of these functions.

> 'And he gave some to be apostles: and some, prophets: and some, evangelists: and some, pastors and teachers: for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ' (*Eph.* iv, 11).

This magnificent conception of the Universal Church is presented by St. Paul in all its fullness in the so-called *Epistle to the Ephesians*, and what is of no little interest, St. Paul, himself, strove with enormous energy, heroic resolution, and practical sagacity, to put his ideal into practice beginning with the Roman Empire and its hundred million souls. The history of Europe during the last eighteen hundred years has shown the dangers which beset the realization of the Pauline ideal. History shows how many have utilized that ideal for narrower and baser ends than St. Paul had in view, and by making use of methods which he would have scorned and denounced. The perversion of the Pauline ideal, in the form of ecclesiasticism, sacerdotalism and papalism, narrowed the Gospel of Jesus in which every human being is your brother, and led to the restriction of the conception of brotherhood to your fellow-Churchmen or your fellow-sectarians. But these failures constitute no defect in the Pauline ideal of a universal Church, they only indicate the moral, spiritual and intellectual weakness of humanity. The Pauline ideal of a universal Church still stands as something to be realized practically for the benefit of the human race, and as I venture to think, a necessity for its moral and spiritual progress and the evolution of the highest and most permanent type of civilization.

There is a group of theological doctrines which we are led to think of as characteristically Pauline. The first of these is

the doctrine of Justification by Faith. This doctrine appears to have had little influence on the life of the Christian Church until Martin Luther, the Augustinian monk, ascending on his knees Pilate's stairs in Rome, heard in his heart the words of the prophet Habbakuk, 'The just shall live by faith,' which St. Paul had used in his exposition of that doctrine.

Martin Luther rose from his knees and thenceforth pursued virtue by a new method other than by obedience to an infinity of monastic regulations. So it was that this Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith became a most important influence in the religious thought of all the Reformed Churches — Lutheran, Calvinist, and Evangelical.

That doctrine, as St. Paul presents it, was intended to deliver those who were enslaved by Jewish legalism, and thought of Jewish legalism as the only road to the highest moral and spiritual life. St. Paul, as we have pointed out, set over against this slave-method another virtue as he regarded it, the method of freedom to be realized by those who knew themselves to be the sons of God, not His slaves.

It was the method of reliance upon the strength and guidance of the Spirit of God by those who seek that help. The arguments by which St. Paul expounds and defends this method of achieving the 'good life' are often rabbinical, forensic, even casuistical — and for their proper understanding and appreciation require a knowledge of Jewish Rabbinism and of contemporary conditions which few except scholars possess to-day.

Closely connected with the Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith is the Pauline interpretation of the death of Jesus as a propitiatory or expiatory sacrifice, by faith in which the sins of men are forgiven. To do justice to this Pauline doctrine of the Atonement it is necessary to understand the practice and influence of the sacrificial system in Jewish religion from which Paul desired to liberate believers in Christ. We see the Divine forgiveness of sin in a different way from that in which St. Paul presents it in his Epistles.

If we believe in the Divine forgiveness of sins, we believe in it as it is presented in the teaching of Jesus Himself, as dependent upon the spirit of penitence, forgiveness and love in the hearts and lives of those who seek the Divine forgiveness.

If the contemplation of the death of Christ makes men forgivable, then the Pauline way of presenting the death of Christ as leading to the forgiveness of sins has validity to-day. But for many the Pauline presentation of the death of Christ as an expiatory and propitiatory sacrifice seems to be a relic of religious thinking which is out of date and which has been used, not to free men from sin itself, but from the terror of that nemesis which sin involves.

Another characterstically Pauline doctrine is that of Divine Predestination and Election. That Pauline doctrine, which in the early days of Christianity was one of comfortable assurance for those who were called into the Christian Church, became, in the theological speculation of St. Augustine, an amazing complex of horror and ruthless cruelty. It exercised its most terrible effect in the religion of Calvin, and here pre-eminently in Scottish Presbyterianism. Robert Burns satirises it in Holy Willy's prayer, which opens wth the words :

> 'O Thou who in the heavens dost dwell,
> And as it pleases best Thysel
> Sends ain to heaven and ten to hell
> All for Thy glory,
> And not for any good or ill
> They've done afore Thee.'

We cannot but believe that St. Paul would have been both amazed and horrified at such perversions of his doctrine of Predestination and Election. This doctrine was the outcome of St. Paul's inherited belief in the omniscience and omnipotence of God, which he believed worked without let or hindrance in the Creative process and in human history.

Many of us to-day, although believing in the Divine wisdom and in the Divine power and the Divine Will operating in the creative process and manifest in some measure, at least to the eye of faith, in human history and, we may even dare to say, in our own personal lives and religious experience, are quite unable to accept with assurance the Pauline doctrine of Predesination.

The doctrine of Election, which in the Pauline mind seems to have gone with the doctrine of Predestination, would seem to have its justification in the fact that in our human experience individuals and nations seem to be called to achieve certain tasks of Divine and human service for the benefit of mankind,

not primarily for their own personal salvation nor for the purpose of securing for themselves a blessed immortality.

I think a careful study of St. Paul's doctrine of Election would show that it is concerned with this life. St. Paul regarded himself as a vessel of election, which meant for him that he was chosen to do a special work in the propagation of the religion of Jesus Christ in the pagan world: not that he was selected by God for a blessed immortality.

Predestination is dead to-day, but the belief in Divine election survives and revives in the soul of every man or woman who feels, for reasons which no one can appreciate but themselves, that they have been divinely called to achieve some particular task for God or man. A careful study of biography and autobiography reveals this latent conviction, where in many cases it was neither known nor suspected by the friends of those who had identified the main work and purpose of their life with a Divine vocation.

We pass now to other elements in the Pauline Gospel — elements which are really not essential to it and which seem to have no permanent value for religion. They are for the most part the product of Paul's Jewish heredity and Rabbinical training. Augustine of Hippo, a Catholic Christian, retained to the end of his life and exhibits in his teaching the impress of the years when in his pre-Christian period he was an adherent of Manicheeism. Very few men, even the greatest, can escape their past, and this is true of St. Paul, the converted Rabbi. His view of the Old Testament scriptures is essentially Jewish. He seems to regard every word of them as inspired by God. His whole view of the origin of the Universe and the history of mankind is determined by them. His interpretation of them is Rabbinical — ingenious indeed, but unconvincing to those who recognize the artificiality of Rabbinical exegesis. Even Luther, the devotee of St. Paul, was compelled to exclaim, when dealing with St. Paul's argument in the *Galatians*, 'He saith not, And to seeds, as of many' — Brother Paul, this does not hold.

No modern man with a knowledge of the universe as unveiled by modern science, with a knowledge of human history as unveiled by modern historical research, with a knowledge of

scripture as laid bare by our higher critics, can attach any permanent value to these interesting archaisms presented in the Pauline writings. But if St. Paul's Jewish Rabbinism, with all its limitations, is manifest in the sphere of scripture and its interpretation, it is as profoundly manifest in his attitude towards woman. He regards her as inferior to man (who is the glory of God) and as created to be subordinate to man. He thinks of her—*facile decipiens sed facilius decepta*—as the means by which sin, the trail of the serpent, the *damnosa haereditas*, entered into the world 'with all our woe and loss of Eden.' St. Paul thinks of woman as a means of temptation, not only to man, but also to the angels, and for that very reason she must appear veiled and with her head covered in the Christian assemblies where angels are present as well as men.[1]

Because of woman's subordination to man, save she be an inspired virgin, for the Holy Spirit may not be gainsaid, she is not to be permitted to preach or to prophesy in the Christian assemblies. It was when her attention was drawn to this prohibition that Mme. Antoinette Stirling, the Victorian singer and early protagonist of 'the Rights of Woman,' remarked emphatically: 'That is where I and Paul differ.'

St. Paul is equally archaic in his outlook on future human history on this planet. He looks forward in the near future to a tremendous cataclysm when the crucified Jesus, attended by myriads of flaming angels, shall descend to earth from the sky, heralded by the trump of God, *tuba sonum spargens mirum*, which shall bring forth all the dead from their graves to stand before the Son of Man in the Great Assize of universal judgment.

We cannot here deal adequately with the sources of the Pauline anticipation, shared also by great numbers of his fellow-Christians. Some assign it pre-eminently to Jesus Himself. This I gravely doubt. The roots of this conception of future world history go back to the prophet Amos, with his proclamation of the 'Day of the Lord,' *Dies Irae*, *Dies Illa*, and this prophetic looking forward to the coming judgment for mankind was certainly supplemented in the sphere of dramatic imagery by Zoroastrianism with its conception of the Great Assize.

[1] See *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, by St. John Thackeray, p. 159.

The Zoroastrian influence on Jewish religion, and subsequently on Christianity, has not been sufficiently recognized as yet by the Christian world. This Zoroastrian influence is also seen in another sphere in which the Pauline Gospel is strangely remote from modern ways of thinking — I refer to the sphere of angelology and demonology. For Zoroastrians, as for first century Jews and Christians, St. Paul included, the universe was full of demons and angels. These spiritual and invisible beings carried on incessant war with each other in the heavenly places, but also took no little part in human affairs.

The demons, with their leader Satan — the Zoroastrian Ahriman—were the enemies of mankind, the source of disease, madness, and every form of physical disaster. St. Paul's physical infirmities, the Apostle, notwithstanding the enlightenment of contemporary Greek medical science, attributed to Satan. As for the angels, they operated the physical activities of the universe — angels of death, of life, of rain, of hail, of stars and planets. They intervened also in the human political world and became the patrons and protagonists of rival nations, thereby becoming responsible for many political conflicts—a distracting and a difficult world for men to live in. And yet not without hope for St. Paul, for, by the eye of faith, he discerned and taught that all these demonic hosts and angelic orders were subject to Jesus Christ.

This Pauline demonology and angelology, though efforts are being made to buttress it to-day in ecclesiastical circles, are, we cannot but believe, among the things which are passing away.

Although St. Paul's ethical teaching is of permanent value, and not only that portion of it which he derived directly from Jesus, but also his particular expansions and applications of the principles of Jesus, yet the limitations of that ethic will be manifest in many ways to the modern moralist. This was due in a very large measure to practical considerations which, St. Paul was shrewd enough to recognize, must be used to curb any policy which would push to extremes the application to practical situations of ethical idealism. The social democrat to-day is disappointed to find that, although St. Paul declared that all men were brothers in Christ and in the Christian Church, yet they must submit with loyalty and reverence to a tyrannical and even

unjust imperialism. They must on no account become political revolutionaries or support, even in a pacifist way, seditious propaganda.

So too in the case of the horrible institution of slavery—against which the modern Christian conscience has utterly revolted and has achieved its extirpation even by bloodshed and force of arms—St. Paul acquiesced in. He exhorts the Christian slave-owner to remember that his Christian slave is his brother in Christ and to treat him accordingly. He exhorts the Christian slave to treat his Christian owner with the same loyalty of service which it is his duty to offer to the Lord Christ, but he says not a word about the abolition of slavery save that if a slave by legal means can secure his freedom he should use this rather than remain in slavery.

There are few things about which the modern Christian conscience in this country is more sensitive than in the treatment of animals. We could not feel that a man was a Christian, nor indeed a decent human being, who could ill-treat animals. We all recognize that we have a duty to the animal world as well as to the human world. St. Paul recognized nothing of the kind. Commenting on the delightfully humane injunction in the *Book of Deuteronomy*, 'Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn,' he asks :

> 'Doth God take care for oxen? Nay, this is not written with reference to them. It was meant to teach that there must be adequate remuneration for preachers of the Gospel.'

I doubt if even the most conservative Bishop begging to-day for Church funds would be able to make use of the Pauline argument.

There is one more point of extreme difficulty in the Pauline Gospel which I have left to the last. What place and use did St. Paul assign to Sacraments in his ideal for the religious life and in his plan for the Universal Church?

This is a burning question in Christian circles in this country to-day. Professor Kirsopp Lake seems to hold that St. Paul was a materialistic and even magical sacramentalist. Dr. Schweitzer seems to hold nothing of the kind. The fact is, St. Paul contradicted himself in talking of sacraments. He was a practical man and practical men have a way of being entirely

consistent in their practice, although unable often to produce any consistent theory to justify it. And that is because they have a way of deciding on the policy first, for practical purposes, and trying to secure the theoretical justification of that policy afterwards. In many cases it would be better if they had been content to follow the dictum of a judicious bishop who said: 'Give your conclusions, but never give your reasons.'

Paul valued for practical purposes the great Christian Sacrament of his day, the initiatory rite of Baptism. He interpreted it in the light of the initiatory ceremonies of the Greek Mystery religions. By Baptism the initiate mystically shared the experience of Jesus Christ — the Lord of the Christian Mystery. He, the initiate, when plunged beneath the Baptismal wave was mystically buried with Christ, and rising from the water he shared mystically in Christ's resurrection and in the new life which Christ came to give to men.

And yet when St. Paul is writing to the Corinthian Church the very place in which it is believed he first presented the Christian Gospel in the form of a Greek mystery religion he could write:

> 'I baptized the household of Stephanas. I know not if I baptized any other, for the Lord sent me not to baptize but to preach the Gospel.'

St. Paul would seem not to have been a very ardent sacramentalist after all, nor to have regarded even the great sacrament of the Christian Church as a prime element in the Christian Gospel, or in his own apostolic mission.

And then for that second and lesser Sacrament — for in St. Paul's day it certainly ranked second, not first — 'the breaking of the bread,' 'the supper of the Lord,' 'the communion (or sharing in) of the body and blood of Christ.' St. Paul supports its practice because it was instituted by Jesus on the night of His betrayal and by celebrating it Christians show forth the Lord's death 'till He come.' It is thus a symbolical rite and there is no materialist magic about it in this portion of St. Paul's exposition of it. He finds a parallel to it in the sacred feasts of paganism when foods which had been offered to pagan Deities were partaken of, and urges that those who partake of the sacramental bread and wine ought not also to dine at the tables of

demons or false gods. Here perhaps we are approaching materialistic sacramentalism in the Pauline Gospel, but we have not reached it. Then next St. Paul writes of those who gluttonously and without spiritual feeling partake of the Christian sacramental elements as liable to incur illness and death. 'For this cause many among you are weak and sickly, and not a few sleep' (*i.e.* have died) (I *Cor.* xi, 30).

Here we have reached something in sacramental doctrine which might have come from Central Africa. Can we imagine Jesus saying this?

Possibly it was this Pauline utterance which caused Bernard Shaw to write:

> 'There has really never been a more monstrous imposition perpetrated than the imposition of Paul's soul upon the soul of Jesus.'
>
> 'Paul was no more a Christian, than Jesus was a Baptist.'

Yet St. Paul never supposed himself to be infallible, and was well aware of his limitations, and of the provisional character of some at least of his teaching. It was he who wrote: 'We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.' Where we modern Christians go wrong in relation to St. Paul is when we allow the partial and the imperfect in his teaching to limit or replace the teaching of Jesus Christ.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE TWO MARKS?*

The opinion that St. Mark's Gospel is composite, based on earlier sources is steadily gaining ground. Some think it is a combination of two or more written sources dovetailed together in much the same way as those, who hold the Proto-Luke hypothesis, think that portions of Mark and Proto-Luke are combined in Luke iii—xxiv. And this is a tenable hypothesis, although except in Mark xiii and in the account of the Passion (xiv, 1—xvi, 8) it hardly seems possible to reconstruct continuous sources with accuracy. Canon Crum holds a different theory. He thinks that there is

* *St. Mark's Gospel: two stages of its making.* By Canon J. M. C. Crum. (Heffer and Sons. 6/- net.)

one continuous written source which he calls Mark I written at Rome about 60 A.D.

> 'Peter's friend,' he writes, 'the innkeeper's son, may be this Mark I telling his story, as talk with Peter had shaped it in his mind as he grew from fifteen to forty-five years old, or say from A.D. 30 to 60.'

Whether he regards Mark II, which he dates about A.D. 65, as ever having existed as a separate work I am not quite sure, but I incline to think that he rather regards Mark II as an editor who enlarged Mark I by inserting a large amount of additional matter. The additions of Mark II he holds have such well-defined characteristics that his work

> 'can be, as it were, lifted away all in one, leaving behind the older, less theological story, which is Mark I.'

The work of Mark II consists of quotations from and references to the LXX, folk stories and folk memories and extracts from Q or a Q-like document. It is characterised by its theological tendency, by its insistence on the opposition of the Pharisees to Jesus, by its interest in demoniacal possession, by its artificial arrangement in the earlier chapters, which groups the events together so as to make them occupy six days, an arrangement which leads the author to say that the transfiguration took place after six days.

With becoming modesty Canon Crum admits 'that every step in the delicate operation of making this separation is of course conjecture.'

The extreme difficulty of reconstructing continuous sources from Chapters i—xii and the distrust of his own results which anyone who has attempted such a reconstruction must feel, make the theory that there is one continuous source with numerous interpolations well worth considering. Whether the reconstruction of Mark I which Canon Crum has made is altogether satisfactory is another matter.

There seem to me to be serious objections to it. After the account of the death of the Baptist Mark I's narrative continues, vi, 45, 'and straightway Jesus constrained his disciples to go . . . to Bethsaida'; viii, 22, 'and they came to Bethsaida'; 27, 'and Jesus went forth with his disciples into the villages of Caesarea Philippi.' Is it conceivable that if Mark I was 'telling the story as talk with Peter had shaped it in his mind' he would ever have written anything like this? What purpose does the double mention of Bethsaida serve if the author is not going to tell us anything that happened there?

Canon Crum gives both the cursing of the barren fig tree and the greater part of the account of the incident which led to the execution of the Baptist as part of Mark I, but to many it may seem that these two narratives are as likely to be folk stories as any of those which he relegates to Mark II.

His examination of the thirty-six words which he regards as characteristic of Mark II does not seem wholly convincing; some of them, *e.g.* *Kraspedon* and *Lailaps* occur only once in the Gospel, others only a few times. The word *euthus* (or as he rather strangely prefers to read *eutheōs*)

occurs about forty-one times in the Gospel, of these occurrences only five are in Mark I and therefore the word must be regarded as specially characteristic of Mark II. At first sight this is impressive but on closer examination it is less so. He retains the word in vi, 25, 27, but drops it in i, 21, 29, 30, though the evidence for retaining or dropping it is much the same in all five cases, save that in i, 21 the evidence for dropping it is weaker than in the other four places. The point is not unimportant because it suggests that the writer is dealing with the text in an arbitrary manner.

His treatment of the word kērussōn (why he indicates the participle rather than the present indicative I know not) is disconcerting. He says it is always Mark II or later than Mark II and that it is used fourteen times. The present participle is used only three times and other parts of the verb nine times, apart from two places in the spurious ending. Furthermore it is used once in his Mark I *viz.* i, 38. Inaccurate statements of this kind naturally impair our confidence in the author's arguments.

Again we ask, what does 'later than Mark II' mean? Does it mean, for instance, the spurious ending? or does it mean that a later hand than Mark II has edited the Gospel as a whole? If the latter, it leaves us uncertain whether peculiarities of diction are to be attributed to Mark II or a later editor, and one of the tests for deciding the validity of the distinction between Mark I and Mark II is weakened if not destroyed.

But there is a question more important than these matters of detail which must be faced. Presumably 'Peter's friend' may be identified with Mark, who if he wrote in about A.D. 60, had as we learn from Acts and Colossians been in contact with St. Paul. There would then be no improbability in his narrative being coloured by Pauline theology and Pauline phraseology. If this be so one of Canon Crum's reasons for relegating all passages so coloured to Mark II disappears.

To my thinking the criteria on which he relies are too subjective to carry conviction. Had he shewn for instance that all passages in which Jesus is addressed as Rabbi belonged to one document and all in which he is addressed as didaskale to another, or that 'disciples' was used to describe Christ's followers in one document and 'the twelve' in another, it would have been far more convincing.

Although there seem to be strong reasons for rejecting the reconstruction of Mark I made by Canon Crum, he may still be on the right track in trying to disentangle a primitive Petrine Gospel from the other sources of Mark.

E. R. BUCKLEY.

THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST *

Mr. Best's book, *The Miracles of Christ,* may be described as historically conservative and apologetically modernist. That is, his aim is to maintain the credibility of the events usually called the 'miracles' of Jesus,

* *The Miracles of Christ in the Light of our Present-Day Knowledge.* By John H. Best, B.Sc. (S.P.C.K. 6/-.)

and the incredibility of the traditionalist type of miracle-apologetic with which the student of the theological literature of the nineteenth century is so familiar. Perhaps it is for this reason that the present reviewer finds the book weaker on the historical side than on the apologetic.

The book consists of five chapters, entitled respectively 'On the Possibility of Miracles,' 'The New Testament Evidence as to their Actual Occurrence,' 'Nature and the Supernatural,' 'The Various Classes of Miracles,' and 'The Miracles of the Resurrection and Ascension.' There are also three Appendices and four illustrations—the latter a somewhat unusual feature in a book of this kind. The two pen-and-ink sketches of 'The Empty Tomb' should be helpful to teachers of Scripture in schools, and the diagram on 'Extension of our Ideas about Light' will be of interest to those who wish to make modern scientific theories plain.

The book is sincerely and reverently written, but would have been more cogent if the author had tried to prove less. In spite of his 'scientific' approach, he leaves the impression on the mind of the careful reader that all the events in the Gospels which have been called 'miracles' should, with negligible exceptions, be taken together. Thus his aim is to show that 'from the scientific point of view' such narrated events as the Johannine 'signs' really happened. To my own view his treatment of these Johannine 'signs' indicates a failure to understand the mind of the author and the nature of his Gospel. Likewise, the treatment of our Lord's Temptation indicates, as I cannot but think, a failure to understand the symbolism of Christ Himself. The notion that Jesus really was 'tempted' to turn stones into bread is one so incorporated into apologetic that it is generally taken to buttress the precise historicity of all the 'nature-miracles.' 'Turning stones into bread' is, to my own mind, as much symbolical speech on the part of Jesus as 'casting mountains into the sea.'

Where, then, is Mr. Best's 'Modernism'? Precisely here, that he reveals himself as one of the growing number of Christians who find the old semi-deistic division of events into 'natural' and 'supernatural' as neither tenable nor helpful. Perhaps if he were better acquainted with the apologetic literature of the nineteenth century he would have been a little less severe on Matthew Arnold and a little more appreciative of the whole rock whence progressive Christian thought has been hewn. A careful student of theological literature in its historical setting could hardly have written, when speaking of Matthew Arnold's well-known remark about the changing of a pen into a pen-wiper: 'A more inept comparison was never, I think, made by a cultivated writer.' Further, it would be worth Mr. Best's while to ponder more deeply what Matthew Arnold really meant when he said that 'miracles do not happen,' and to ask himself wherein he himself differs.

I fear that Mr. Best's book will do little to clarify the present very turbid stream of Christian apologetic. In one or two places he is careful to declare that he does not wish to dogmatize; and it would seem that he has

still an open mind in regard to some dubious stories which he seeks to retain. But with his closing sentences all Christians will agree: 'After all, it will not depend upon our beliefs in reference to miracles or in reference to anything else, that we shall enter at last upon the Perfected Life of Heaven, but it will depend upon our constantly renewed endeavours to follow, in so far as the conditions of the present life of each one of us permit, our Lord's most holy footsteps.' C. J. WRIGHT.

BISHOP TALBOT *

Edward Stuart Talbot was in many ways a fortunate man. He was born of the governing classes: both his grandfathers were peers. His mother, with a fine sense of propriety, held that the second degree from the peerage should 'form the link with the *working class* of the gentry,' and thus Edward was sent to Charterhouse. This was in 1856. Thence he passed to Christ Church, where he took firsts in Greats and History, and, in 1866, was elected a Student. Three years later he was ordained Deacon by Samuel Wilberforce, and the next year saw both his ordination as Priest and his marriage to Lavinia Lyttelton. Talbot came under the influence of the rising Oxford Movement, which had passed its first phase of persecution, and he found his spiritual leaders in such men as Gladstone, Church, and Liddon. In 1869, before he was ordained, he was offered the first Wardenship of Keble College. The new Warden's genius for making and keeping friends, his social connections and delight in hospitality, his intellectual distinction, and his capacity for work all helped to increase both the numbers and prestige of the new College.

In 1885 misfortune came to Talbot in the form of serious illness, and his life was, for a time, despaired of. When he recovered he was permanently crippled by a stiff knee-joint. This handicap, which increased with the years, he bore with gay courage. Three years later he succeeded Dr. Jayne as Vicar of Leeds. The work in Leeds was drastically different from what he had done in Oxford. He brought to it a trained mind, a sound judgment, a ready sympathy, considerable physical powers of endurance, and a readiness to learn. After a vicariate of six years which upheld the Tractarian tradition of a great Parish Church, he passed to the see of Rochester. Ten years later, in 1905, he created the Diocese of Southwark and became its first Bishop. 'Let there be no doubt,' a friend said of him, 'he loved being a Bishop.' Talbot possessed many qualities which go to make a good and happy Bishop. His own faith was simple and sincere, he had a profound belief in the Church, he liked administration and desired to be fair, he delighted in public occasions and was entirely unselfconscious, he rejoiced in the variety of human personality and was, by temperament, thoroughly sociable. In London he was in the centre, and knew personally

* *Edward Stuart Talbot; 1844—1934.* By Gwendolen Stephenson. (S.P.C.K. 10/6. pp. 352.)

and through his family connections many leaders both in Church and State. He played a useful part in many important matters, including the Education Act of 1902. He found the tide was flowing with his moderate High Church opinions. The more extreme developments of Anglo-Catholicism left him doubtful; his Catholicism was always very English, and he desired to do full justice to other schools of thought among his clergy and to work, so far as he could consistently with his principles, with those outside the Church.

At the age of 67 he was translated to Winchester, which he held for twelve years. These years brought the War, and for Talbot the death of his son Gilbert, the first break in the happiness of his home. He gave much thought and time to extra-Diocesan questions, such as the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference, the Student Christian Movement, the Enquiry into Religion in the Army, the World Alliance, the Lambeth Conference, and Reunion matters. Among the many interesting things in this biography is a correspondence between Lord Hugh Cecil and himself on the subject of C.O.P.E.C.

Talbot's last ten years, from 1924, were spent in London. Here he lived and worked as an Elder Statesman of the Church and was, incidentally, much in Davidson's confidence. To have retired to solitude would have been quite uncongenial to him; he loved to be mixing with his fellows, and had (a rare interest these days) a passion for reading aloud, which he did very well. 'London is very charming,' he wrote, as he settled down after the move from Winchester, 'and our home is delightful and friends many, but it isn't quiet, or we don't make it so.'

Miss Stephenson's biography gives a full and kind picture of the Bishop, has many interesting side-lights on public questions and public persons. In a just epilogue the author concurs in von Hügel's estimate that Talbot was not a great thinker. Nor was he, his biographer judges, a great master of the spiritual life. 'His self-discipline was austere . . . but asceticism troubled him. The normal happy life, hallowed and dutiful, satisfied him.' His greatness lies, Miss Stephenson suggests, 'in the wholeness of his life and character,' a wholeness rooted in faithful co-operation with the purpose of God.

Talbot rejoiced that the Church of England had a comfortable homeliness and yet welcomed a spirit of adventure. His temperament led him to emphasize the former. In 1873, in a fine statement of the Tractarian spirit, he wrote:

> 'A Catholic Theology utterly fixed in its great central principles and in many of their corollaries, yet ever yielding up new meanings, even from its depths in the light of other knowledge and human development. Such a theology, and at the same time a Church system, unchanging in one sense, yet elastic in another, and these two together capable of laying hold upon the future, its movements, questions, temptations, advantages, discoveries; this is what we want' (p. 55).

He was genuine in his respect for new truth and cautious in his acceptance of it. The spirit of adventure was not congenial to him personally. In

1891 he wrote:

> 'I shrink unspeakably from the unknown. So the great astronomical discoveries are to me, naturally, simply appalling. They make me miserably uncomfortable. To try and dwell on them would, I think, almost literally make me sick. So with thought. There seems to me to be a sort of ocean of tumbling ideas into which convictions and faith easily crumble. I cannot say how it appals me . . .' (p. 310).

The former statement has a pleasant Victorian ring, a moving faith in orderly progress. The latter confession is one which not only Talbot would make in the Church of England even of to-day. A later generation, knowing themselves beset by the unknown, troubled by men seeking to enter violently into the Kingdom of God, can turn with a certain relief to Talbot's story, which, though it has little of the elemental as men must be elemental to-day or perish, yet is the story of a great English gentleman.

H. G. Mulliner.

REFORMATION PRACTICE AND REUNION *

An adequate review of this book could be written only by one whose knowledge was equal to that of the author and who could therefore check every one of the author's numerous references. Such knowledge is not possessed by the writer of this review, but, as the book received the approval of the University of Oxford when it was offered as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Divinity, it may be assumed that the writer's array of witnesses has been carefully scrutinized.

Dr. Carter's purpose is to show that in the Reformation period the Church of England was not only a Reformed Church but remained in close communication and communion with the Reformed Churches of the Continent. So far as we can judge, the author proves this point, namely, that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Church of England was in communion with the Reformed (*i.e.* Calvinist) Church of the Continent, though it did not look with favour on non-episcopal churches in England, where the National and Reformed Church had chosen to remain episcopal. Its attitude towards the Church of Scotland seems to have changed after that Church had in 1638 disowned the episcopate which it had accepted in 1610.

This book is a most careful examination of the policy of the Church of England in the Reformation period, but we doubt whether it will have much weight in regard to the question of our attitude towards the non-episcopal churches at the present day; for

1. Since 1662 the relation of the Church of England towards the non-episcopal churches of the Continent, though not exclusive, has been less cordial than before that date.

2. Since 1833 the Tractarian movement and its results have drawn a section of the Church of England away from the Reformed Church and to-

* *The Reformation and Reunion.* By the Rev. C. Sydney Carter, D.D. (1936. 3/6.)

wards the unreformed, whether Eastern, Roman, or Old Catholic; and while that section is not dominant, it is powerful enough to thwart the efforts of other sections of that Church towards inter-communion with the Church of Scotland and the other Reformed Churches at home and abroad.

3. Owing to the rise of Biblical criticism, the Reformed Churches are for the most part divided into Traditionalists and Liberals; and the Liberals cannot appeal to Scripture in the same way as did Lutherans, Calvinists and even Socinians in the pre-critical age.

Hence some who would agree with Dr. Carter's survey of the relation of these Churches in the Reformation period would argue that to-day the question assumes a different form and that new questions cannot be decided only by an appeal to the precedents of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The writer of this notice is at one with Dr. Carter in wishing that the later attitude of the Church of England towards the other Reformed Churches had been developed on the lines suggested in the Reformation period; he therefore commends this book as showing to those who are willing to listen to evidence the grounds on which we can submit that the Liberal attitude is in accordance with the principles of the English Reformation.

J. F. Clayton.

A BISHOP AND THE CRITICS*

There can hardly be too many books of this type, provided they are the work of competent scholars. The majority of Church people have still only the vaguest idea as to what 'criticism' may be, and in wide circles the word retains a sinister significance. In this short and very inexpensive book the Bishop of Bradford seeks to enlighten and reassure them. He begins by a defence of criticism in the abstract, illustrating his contention by reference to the work of the critics in the sphere of Old Testament research. He then proceeds to give a brief account of the criticism of the Gospels, summarizing critical conclusions as to the relations of the synoptic Gospels, and adding a few paragraphs on the problem of the Fourth Gospel. Dr. Blunt then turns to consider the theological inferences which have been drawn from critical studies, and gives an unfavourable account of Liberal Protestantism, which he regards as founded rather upon Rationalism, Materialism, and Ritschlianism, than upon an impartial study of the Gospels. Chapters follow dealing with 'The Eschatologists' and with Form-Criticism, and the last chapter is headed 'Scholarship and Faith.'

It would be too much to expect that in a work so brief as this the author should justify all his statements, or even follow his line of argument consistently, but it must be admitted that his general tone is somewhat dogmatic. He is too ready to assume that all scholars who do not agree with him are influenced by prejudice. It is admitted that nobody

* *The Gospels and the Critic.* By A. W. F. Blunt, D.D., Bishop of Bradford. (Oxford University Press. 1936. 2/6.)

(even the most orthodox) 'can study the problems of the Gospels from a wholly detached point of view,' but that hardly justifies the contrast (p. 13) between Old and New Testament criticism. The Old Testament scholar may be given a free hand for he is to be trusted to preserve a scholarly impartiality, but 'in regard to the New Testament the work of scholarship has not been so free from preconceptions on the part of those engaged in it.' The reference is evidently to the Liberal Protestant critics of Germany 'who had the disadvantage of sitting loose to all Christian tradition.' Despite their learning, industry, and ingenuity, they displayed an inability to see the whole range of facts, and for that reason their reconstruction proved unsatisfactory. Their work is of merely historic interest, and now survives only in the productions of the Ratlionalist Press Association, the columns of the *Freethinker,* and the opinions of a handful of conservative Modernists.

The overthrow of Liberal Protestantism was due to three causes; first, the work of the Eschatologists; second, the growing conviction that the early Church had a dogmatic and not merely an ethical conception of its Founder; and third, the realization that this school could give us only a 'reduced Christianity.' It may be asked how far these three influences point in the same direction. Harnack, by representing Jesus as an inspired teacher of morals, may have given us a 'reduced Christianity,' but the position was scarcely improved by Schweitzer, who represented Him as a deluded dreamer. It is very strange that orthodox writers still retain their admiration of Schweitzer as the destroyer of Liberal Protestantism. If indeed he did overthrow Liberal Christianity, it was surely because it was Christian, not because it was liberal. We may reject German nineteenth century theology as unsatisfying and unhistorical, but we can hardly enthrone Schweitzer as the defender of the faith. The modern world could revere a great ethical teacher, though it might not address to him the historic worship of the Christian Church; but, as Dr. Inge once said, the only place for a pure apocalyptist would be a lunatic asylum. When *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* was first published, a certain school in England loudly acclaimed the work of Schweitzer because they felt that now at last they could refute the Germans. But Schweitzer has proved a dangerous ally. Dr. Blunt is critical of the eschatologists; but if they were wrong, why give them such prominence? Two wrongs do not make a right. He evidently feels this, and ends chapter iv with an account of the 'Impasse of Scholarship,' illustrated rather curiously by Guignebert's *Jesus.*

How are we to escape from the impasse? We cannot return to a discredited Liberal Protestantism, and if we go all the way with the eschatologists we must follow Loisy into the wilderness. Chapter v deals with Form-criticism, but the author is doubtful as to its value. He brings out one point which might have been developed further; form-criticism helps us to realize how very early some of the Gospel traditions are. 'This greatly strengthens the line of evidence by carrying it back, not to this or that evangelist, but to the living voice of the Christian communities in the

earliest formative period.' If Dr. Blunt had driven home the argument that the Gospels represent to a great extent the earliest Christian preaching at a time when eye-witnesses were not extinct, he might have shown us a way out of the impasse. But in the last chapter he beats a rapid retreat. Wishing to reassure his readers, he falls back upon the impregnable stronghold of ecclesiastical tradition.

> 'The Church's interpretation of Christ's Person is something which comes to us on the continuous authority of the Church, and the literary basis of it is found in the New Testament from St. Paul onwards. If we hold fast to that, such questions as are rained on points of detail by criticism need not trouble us much. The Catholic can afford to be critical, for he has in the Church's tradition about Christ that which will safeguard him from the *outré* and the irresponsible in his arguments or conclusions.'

If this remarkable passage means anything it means, first, that the Catholic approaches all important critical questions with his mind already made up; secondly, that, whatever the critics say, the New Testament read uncritically is authoritative; thirdly, that the Church's interpretation overrules all criticism; and lastly, that the points raised by Harnack, Schweitzer, and Guignebert are mere details, unimportant to faith. It is a disappointing conclusion to a useful book, but perhaps this was the part read to the Church Congress in 1935. 'I thowt a said whot a owt to 'a said an' I coomed awaäy.'

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

CHRIST AS A PSYCHOLOGIST*

Psychology has become an important subject for the student of religion. This has been due chiefly to the work of the psychologists. On the whole the theologians have been rather slow to face the same problems from their own point of view, although a notable exception has been Dr. Inge, especially in his remarkable book *Faith and its Psychology*. In recent years more books have appeared dealing with psychology from the religious point of view. Among them is the book under review, *Christ's Psychology of the Kingdom*. The author, the Rev. L. Wyatt Lang, has already published an interesting study of Conversion. He is a practising psychologist at the London Clinic for Religious Psychology.

In his present book his object is to study the Gospels in the light of modern psychology, so as to explain 'the system of Jesus' and His methods. A psychological study of the Gospels is both interesting and important, but there are two pitfalls which every enquirer must try to avoid. The first is to seek to know too much. Our records are lamentably scanty. The Gospel-writers were not psychologists, and many incidents of extreme interest to the psychologist are passed over by them with the

* *Christ's Psychology of the Kingdom*. By L. Wyatt Lang, M.A. (Group Publications, Ltd., 29 Dorset Square, London, N.W.1. 8/6.)

briefest mention. The second concerns Gospel criticism. No one can write a convincing study of Christ's psychology unless he has first mastered modern Gospel criticism. Unfortunately, Mr. Lang here goes much astray. He often gives as much weight to sayings of Jesus recorded only in the Fourth Gospel as to sayings which appear in the Synoptists. His analysis of Jesus' conversation with Nicodemus, for instance, is interesting; but he is not justified in assuming that it gives us Jesus' own beliefs concerning conversion. Mr. Lang, indeed, quotes from Dr. Mason's *Teaching of Jesus* and from Dr. Dodds' *The Parables of the Kingdom*; but he has not assimilated the conclusions upon which these first-class books are based, conclusions which are the results of the patient investigations of many scholars through many years, and are conveniently summarized in such a book as Streeter's *The Four Gospels*.

Mr. Lang asserts that Jesus had a 'psychological system':

> 'This system was most carefully thought out in the light of His own experience, from research into the character-development of His associates, from the psychological problems in the evangelism of the prophets in the Old Testament, and also from nature-study. He made research in every direction open to Him, and with scholarly and scientific care.'

The evidence furnished by the Gospels is quite insufficient for such a conclusion. It has been said that the mathematicians have discovered that God is a mathematician. The psychologists would now have us believe that Christ was a psychologist. Some years ago Mr. Bernard Shaw told us that He was a Socialist.

Mr. Lang's thesis, which he has also worked out in his book on Conversion, is that character is developed through the formation of a strong self-sentiment, the conviction of one's own value. This shows itself in early childhood as self-centredness; but the child as he grows up becomes aware of the world of reality outside himself, and he has to come to terms with it. Some master-idea should be sown in his mind, an idea which he can make his own, so that he can identify his self-sentiment with it and build up around it a strong and unified character. If this is to succeed, certain conditions must be fulfilled. The child must love the person sowing the idea, the sower must be convinced of its truth, and a definite event is needed for the sowing to be effective. Mr. Lang coins the word psychorma to describe this. The psychorma in the case of Jesus was His faith in His Sonship to God. Mr. Lang assumes that He owed it to Mary.

This is pure speculation. We have no evidence from which to construct the psychology of Jesus' childhood. We cannot say what part, if any, Mary played in it. All we know for certain is that at the beginning of His public ministry she showed no sympathy with or understanding of what He was doing. Mr. Lang seems to us to over-emphasise the importance of early childhood in the formation of character. He underestimates the value of

later influences, and he practically denies to heredity any importance at all. How much happier parents would be in their children if they could really mould their characters as Mr. Lang imagines!

He asserts that his own principles of psychology were known to Jesus, and that He practised them, for instance, in training the disciples. But here he forgets that Jesus was not dealing with children, as his theory demands, but with grown men, one of whom at least, Peter, was married when he met Jesus. He insists that Jesus taught His disciples by making them fix their affections on Himself. Here Mr. Lang is misled by failure to discriminate the picture of Jesus given us by the Fourth Gospel from the picture in the other three. In the Fourth Gospel the Christian message consists in faith in Jesus Christ. Jesus preaches Himself. But in the Synoptists He encourages the disciples to think for themselves. He keeps His Messiahship from them as a secret, leaving them to find it out without His promptings.

Mr. Lang's book is hard reading; it contains many repetitions and many technicalities. His psychological treatment of the parables does not throw much new light upon them, although he gives them considerable space; while his ignorance or disregard of New Testament criticism invalidates some of his conclusions. But he has written an interesting and suggestive book, illustrated with many examples drawn from the writings and biographies of well-known people. J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

MODERNISTS, ANCIENT AND MODERN*

The term 'Modernist,' like most other terms, is open to objection. Not all Moderns are Modernists; some Modernists are old, and quite a lot of them dead. Mr. Coleman's book deals with this last section. Modernism is as old as the Christian religion and older; there were Modernists or Humanists in Old Testament times, as for example the authors of the *Book of Job* and of *Ecclesiastes*. Mr. Coleman's first example, however, of a liberal thinker is Clement of Alexandria, on whom the late Canon Tollinton has written what Mr. Coleman calls 'a scholarly and masterly book, a work of rare sympathy and insight.' The problem in Clement's day was to reconcile Christianity, oriental in its background and mode of expression, with Greek culture, decadent but still living. To the educated Pagan the scriptures seemed uncouth, barbarous.

> 'It was at Alexandria that East met West and gave each other of their stores, and it was here that there sprang up a movement — with which we associate the name of Philo — the object of which was to reconcile Judaism with the culture of the Western world. It was a modernist movement, set out on the quest to find in Plato an Attic Moses. The Logos or Word of the Fourth Gospel was the central

* *Six Liberal Thinkers.* By the Rev. A. M. Coleman. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1936. 2/6.)

and determining factor of Philo's philosophy; and this conception certainly had a great influence upon Clement and Origen.'

The same problem under different forms faced the Humanists of the Renaissance; on the one hand there was a reaction to Paganism practical and theoretical, on the other the dead force of fanatical obscurantism. Erasmus, the next of Mr. Coleman's liberal thinkers, was a Christian as well as a Humanist:

'While primarily concerned with literature, as such, he was a practical moralist. He hated war — and said so — and all appeals to passion or blind partisanship. He was loyal to reason and quiet commonsense. While not departing from the orthodox standards of his time, he saw in dogmatic theology, in formalism, and magical sacramental views, obstacles to the real ethical Christian life.'

The Reformation settlement was not the settlement that Erasmus would have approved, and it was, after all, only a temporary compromise. Germany was again the scene of the revolt against tradition. Mr. Coleman's sketches of Baur and Strauss, short as they are, are enriched by some first-hand information gathered on a tour in Germany. For example, we are told of the bitter opposition which the founder of the Tübingen School encountered in his earlier days:

'At one time, however, so Fraülein Baur informed the present writer, her grandfather's views were so unpopular that he was not allowed to occupy the pulpit, and had to find, and pay for, a substitute.'

Mr. Coleman thinks that the angularity and cynicism of Mark Pattison are partly accounted for by the fact that he was a 'tyke,' a native of Yorkshire, born at Hornby in Wensleydale. This is a matter on which the present writer cannot pretend to be impartial, but, as the author tells us, Mark's sister, Dorothy, better known as 'Sister Dora,' was familiarly described as a little ray of sunshine — 'an epithet never applied to her brother'; so perhaps it was Oxford that turned the natural kindliness of the Yorkshireman sour. The publication of his Memoirs certainly created a sensation, not exactly a pleasant sensation, in academic circles. Yet beneath a hard exterior Pattison concealed a warm heart; in his bitter revulsion against the Oxford Movement, he never lost his love for Newman, a very touching letter to whom, written by Pattison almost on his deathbed, is quoted. He clung desperately to certain fundamental Christian beliefs.

'He once asked Lionel Tollemache: "Shall I have my library in heaven?" In his sermons he insists strongly upon personal immortality, and suggests the idea that intellectual progress is a means for fitting ourselves for that life as well as personal goodness.'

The last essay, that on Edwin Hatch, centres round Birmingham and King Edward's School, the Alma Mater of Westcott, Lightfoot, Benson

and Hatch. Mr. Coleman insists on the importance of the last of these *alumni,* whose contribution to the history of Church organization he rightly stresses :

> 'Harnack expresses surprise that Hatch should have been only Reader and not Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and should have been doing work which men of less ability could have done. Had Harnack known Oxford he would have withheld his expression of surprise.'

Mr. Coleman's sketches, reprints from articles in various magazines, including the *Modern Churchman,* are necessarily of a slight and introductory character, but they contain a good deal of information not easily to be found elsewhere, and one rises from the perusal wishing for more, and that, after all, as Mr. Tony Weller says, is the great art of writing.

GAMALIEL MILNER.

THE MODERN USE OF THE APOCRYPHA *

In Lent, 1936, Dr. Malden continued at Wells his lectures on the Bible. His new book, *The Apocrypha,* carries on the story of *The Inspiration of the Bible.* Wisely assuming his hearers were likely to be unfamiliar with the Apocrypha, the Dean in his opening lectures succinctly answers three questions : Are these books part of the Bible or not? What is their importance and value for us to-day? How and when did they come to be written? He passes on to give a brief account of the different books according to their differing types. The task is performed with that clarity, restraint, and scholarship which one associates with the Dean of Wells; he assists his hearers with references both classical and modern.

Three passages may be quoted as of special interest. Commenting on *Wisdom* xiii, 1-9, Dr. Malden writes :

> 'The idea of God as *the first author of beauty,* which means that beauty, especially natural beauty, is an end in itself because it is a revelation of Him, has been widely ignored in England. I do not think it fanciful to see in this neglect the root of many of our religious and social discontents.'

In the course of the last lecture, the subject of apocalyptic imagery is discussed. The Dean very pertinently observes that 'what is grotesque conceived as a picture may be perfectly natural, rational, and effective conceived as a symbol.'

> 'After all,' he proceeds, 'what could be more monstrously conceived pictorially than the conventional angel of Christian art? A human figure with the wings of a bird sprouting from his shoulder-blades . . . comparable with the centaur. . . . But as the human intelligence is the highest in the natural order, and the flight of a bird the swiftest and most unchecked motion, no exception can be taken to

* *The Apocrypha.* By R. H. Malden, Dean of Wells. (O.U.P. 4/6. pp. 95.)

the winged human figure as a symbol of a divinely ordained messenger dispatched to do the bidding of the Most High. It is probably, in fact, the best we can devise.'

Perhaps the Dean is right; maybe it is the artist's fault that so many angels look, not as though they had flown from the empyrean, but had been standing a long time in a queue.

At the end of his course Dr. Malden observes of the books of the Apocrypha:

'Acquaintance with them must, I think, make impossible the rigid, narrow, and quite unfounded ideas as to what is meant by Inspiration, which have been and still are widely entertained. These ideas have led to many grotesque misconceptions with regard to the Old Testament, and have been injurious to religion in other ways. It is not, I think, too much to say that they have been responsible for the attitude of mind which led thousands of people, only twenty years ago, to assume that Why does not God stop the war? was a rational question, and that the Church stood or fell by the capacity of the clergy to furnish a succinct answer which would appear satisfactory to the questioner. We can only base our conceptions of the nature of Inspiration on what we find in the Bible — of which the Apocrypha is part. Our conceptions of Inspiration are not a purely academic question. For, whether we know it or not, as they are, so will be our whole idea of the kind of way in which God works in and through men.'

H. G. Mulliner.

THE OLD PROBLEMS*

The late Canon Dearmer, the author of that guide to Anglican correctitude—*The Parson's Handbook*, moved leftwards after the War, and by the time he went to Westminster was a leading Modernist. To be merely a trustee to the picturesque obsolete did not appeal to him, as it appeals to a number of eminent churchmen. Unlike many Anglicans who adopt a more or less liberal standpoint, Dr. Dearmer did not hesitate to implement his modernism by occasionally making unpopular statements—such as his devastating exposure, on grounds of history, of that modern practice of 'Catholic' piety—fasting Communion. Thus he gained the unenviable reputation of being a bad churchman. Under a gentle and almost effeminate manner he concealed a tough mind, thus presenting the strongest of contrasts to the manly, bluff type of theological shirker—the 'live wire'—who is always found on the official side in a theological broil.

This small but important posthumous volume is not, as it happens, concerned with those problems of history and literary criticism which are most disturbing to traditionalists, but with more general ideas of Christian theism, which are approached from the direction of science and philosophy. The book is a very valuable piece of theistic apologetic; lucid, candid,

* *Man and his Maker.* By Percy Dearmer, D.D. (S.C.M. 1936. 3/6.) *Great Issues.* By Neville S. Talbot, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 1936. 3/6.) *Job Finds God.* By Ursula Wells. (A. H. Stockwell, Ltd. 1936. 1/-.)

well-argued and well-informed. Moreover, it approaches the problems from the ordinary man's standpoint; it is not academic in the bad sense.

Passages like the following are typical of the combination of originality, perspicuity, and common sense, which the reader will find throughout these pages:

> 'Do not let us be staggered into pessimism by the idea of the "sum of human suffering." There is no sum. Pain is not cumulative. Two tall men are not twice as tall as one. A thousand people in pain are not more in pain than one person.'

At the same time Dr. Dearmer does not forget to remind us that,

> 'The problem of pain would exist just the same if only one creature in the universe had to endure it.'

The traditional solution of the problem does not commend itself to him:

> 'Our forefathers took refuge in the idea of punishment, and justified it by the myth of a Fall and subsequent notions about a Sin Debt; but this did not save the character of a Creator, whose cruelty could not be mitigated by harnessing it to dialectic injustice.'

Instead of *a priori* theories devised to save the face of some discredited theological theory, Canon Dearmer examines what is the physiological significance of pain:

> 'In studying the pain-points of the nerves we find that they are so exactly distributed as to cause as little pain as is consistent with our preservation. In the eye, for instance, that precious organ which needs instant protection in its exposed delicacy, the pain-points are abundant; but under the massive shield of the skull there are none whatever. . . .
>
> 'If man had lost his vast and intricate system of pain-points, it is very improbable that the human race would now be existing on the face of the earth.'

Again:

> 'Nature is never, it would seem, "purposely" cruel, or in any real sense cruel at all. . . . It is man who is the tormentor; man, who cunningly invented the rack and the stake, whose stupidity and ill-treatment, whose negligences, ignorances—and slums—have caused the pitiful suffering of little children; man, who inflicts more suffering in twenty-four hours of the shooting season (or when he sets his steel traps) than occurs by the accidents of nature in a twelvemonth.'

In a section of his chapter on 'Design and Environment,' Dr. Dearmer has included some very interesting pages upon Water, referring the reader to Professor L. Henderson's *The Fitness of the Environment,* a work which is 'far too little known.'

Dr. Neville Talbot's book is concerned with the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Church. His chapter on 'The Relevance of the Old Testament' is a fine piece of work.

> 'Few people, I think, realise,' writes Dr. Talbot, 'that the great elemental and agonising questions about God, about the mystery of

evil, about the reconciliation of belief in God with the facts of life, are expressed in the latter part of the Old Testament as nowhere else. . . .

'What we find is no solution or explanation of such problems, but the uniquely powerful and passionate expression of them. For the faith of Israel in its last stages of development reached an irresolvable deadlock. It came to a deadlock with the mystery of evil, which was ever the more mysterious to the Jew *vis-a-vis* his growing consciousness of the righteousness of God. . . . With these great basic enigmas the Jew wrestled, in virtue of the very force of his faith in God. But for all his wrestling he reached no solution.'

Dr. Talbot's thesis is that this strange inconclusiveness of the Old Testament, emphasises the conclusiveness of the New Testament. Problems left unsolved, because insoluble apart from the revelation of God Incarnate, find a clear solution there.

'We pass from the irreconcilable by man to the reconciliation wrought by God. . . . The Cross is the Act of God Himself, or it is but the supreme instance of human heroism, throwing into relief by its brilliance the silent blackness of heaven. . . . But deeper than the darkness was the light, deeper than anything the Love of God. For in the Cross God was reconciling the world unto Himself. . . .

'It is not the Cross of Jesus by itself which is the centre of the Gospel, but the Cross followed by the Resurrection. It was the act of God Himself in raising Jesus from the dead which filled the Cross with new meaning. Only so was the Cross transfigured out of horror into joy.'

The truth of course is that the problem left unsolved by *Job* (for Dr. Talbot is right here, *pace* Miss Wells) was first artificially simplified, and then solved, by the 'apocalyptic' writers. They created a dualism — the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the devil. It is not accident that the movement of which the New Testament was a product gave birth not only to Catholicism but to Manicheism and Gnosticism.

But *is* inconclusiveness really such a disadvantage from the religious standpoint? Are the 'ways of God' really fathomable Why should the universe be completely rationalised? In short, which is the deeper view, that of the Hebrew, for whom things were a mystery, or that of the Greek, for whom everything was plain sailing?

Miss Wells's small guide to the Book of Job may be heartily recommended to those who wish to read intelligently that fine creation of the Hebrew genius. But we do wonder whether she is really quite right when she declares that Job, at the end, 'realized that the ways of God were higher than his, and the wonder of God's plan, as he had now discovered it, did not compare with his earlier idea of it.' The patriarch was silenced, but was he convinced? And if he was convinced, *of what* was he convinced? That 'God's in His heaven and all's right with the world'?

J.C.H.

THE VEIL OF GOD*

This little book is one of a series entitled the 'New Library of Devotion.' The Dean of St. Paul's is the general editor of the series, and in his introduction hints that many find it difficult to derive guidance or encouragement from the great classics of devotion. We agree with Dr. Matthews' predecessor at St. Paul's that 'such books are for all times and for every place,' and that the value of a classic is its perennial freshness.

Dr. Wheeler Robinson, whilst making no claim to supersede the great classics of devotion, gives a book full of rich and deep thinking on that aspect of God's Nature which inspired the words of the prophet, 'Verily, Thou art a God that hidest Thyself.'

Defining devotion as a 'fellowship with God which shares, so far as man may, the standpoint of God's purpose and finds in His will its peace,' the author insists 'that the intellect ought to accompany devotion as far as it can go.' Acting on this definition, he calls upon us to think about the world and our life in it in such a way as may help to scatter the clouds of the mind itself, as well as those darkenings of the vision of God which arise from outward circumstances. He treats of several ways in which God's presence and working is seemingly veiled, or perhaps six ways in which God is revealed only by an oblique ray, for the veiling proves to be a rich source of revelation. The Greeks had a word for this concept, *ἐναντιοδρομία.*

'All that has been contributed by Nature, History, Redemption and Scripture,' writes Dr. Wheeler Robinson, 'acquires new and peculiar meaning in the consciousness of the modern Christian. Over against the activity of God in Redemption there is now the human activity of response. Beneath the apparent simplicity and unity of that response lies the rich complexity of influences which have called it forth. When we discover that complexity, the result may be a veiling of God's activity in eliciting the response.'

With patient devotion the reader is led to pierce every veil until he finds divinity. The exercise is most wholesome.

The chapters of the book are followed by very beautiful prayers from such authors as Jeremy Taylor, James Martineau, Dr. Johnson and R. D. Blackmore.

Most of us are pestered with notices of little booklets on pious subjects which are recommended as just the book for the busy parson who seeks a short cut to devotion and a few ready-made thoughts for the pulpit. This is no such book, and we heartily recommend it to the Christian, whether lay or cleric, who finds the need to 'busy his soul with quietude.'

JOSEPH MCDONALD.

* *The Veil of God.* By H. Wheeler Robinson, D.D. (Nisbet & Co. 1936. 2/6.)

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

TOWARDS A NEW LITURGY.

SIR,

May I apologise for inadvertently writing 'weary' in my letter for your March issue.

My plea is that verses quoted in Public Worship from the version of Holy Scripture authorized for that purpose, and which worshippers are most familiar with and love, should be quoted verbatim. The word 'travail' implies *physical* pain; 'refresh' refers to revival by food and drink, in my dictionary.

Surely our Lord's words have an entirely *spiritual* meaning (*vide* Dummelow as follows): 'That labour'—that find life a toil to them; 'are heavy laden'—with the burden of sin; 'I will give you rest'—in this world and the next, rest that comes from peace with God and pardon for sin.

28 Wallace Avenue, Worthing. J. H. LITTLE.

SIR,

The translation of *Matt.* xi, 28 in the Great Bible of 1539 is 'Come unto me all ye that labour and are laden, and I will ease you.' The importunate widow in *Luke* xviii, 5 is appeased by the unjust judge, in the Great Bible of 1539, 'lest she come at the last and raile on me.'

But the word 'weary' was used by the translators of the Great Bible in *Thessalonians* and *Galatians*, so it is clear they had reasons for using a different word in *Matthew* and *Luke*.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Wynches, Much Hadham, Hertfordshire.
April 18th, 1937.

CANON J. M. WILSON AND MODERNISM.

SIR,

I hope that I am not a bore writing too many letters, but with divergent views as to what the Modern Churchmen's Union should stand for I thought the view of my old Headmaster, Canon J. M. Wilson (sometimes described as the Father of English Modernism) might be of interest.

> 'Modernism is to my mind not a creed or a system but a statement of the ultimate basis of union among Christians. Romanists believe that this ultimate basis is the acceptance of the authority of the Pope; Anglo-Catholics that it is an imaginary Catholic tradition; Evangelicals that it is the Bible as God's Word to man; Modernists that it is the Holy Spirit of God working in man. If that view is taken as true, I am a Modernist.'

A young man named Cosmo Gordon Lang was so much impressed by the absolute sincerity of a sermon he heard from him that his was one of the influences that led him to wish to be ordained.

OSWALD YOUNGHUSBAND.

8 Gloucester Row, Clifton, Bristol.
April 14th, 1937.